The Trinity Doctrine Contradicts Human Reason By William S Andrews 1829
The strongest argument against the doctrine of the trinity is, that it contradicts the plainest dictates of human reason, and involves in itself propositions which are directly and utterly opposed to each other. One of these propositions is, that God is a single, independent, and almighty being,—the other is, that he is composed of three distinct persons or agents, united together in some mysterious manner, having but one will and consciousness, and together constituting the divine essence. Now these two are evidently contradictory propositions, and from their very nature destructive of each other. The mathematical proposition, that one and three are the same numbers, is not in itself any more absurd and revolting to reason, than the assertion of both of the foregoing propositions at the same time, but precisely of the same nature and extent; and yet if we were called upon to give our assent to such a proposition, we should say at once, that it was impossible; that the one in its very essence excluded the other and could not co-exist with it. And nothing which could be brought in support of such a proposition, could or ought to induce us to receive it, for we should distrust any kind of evidence sooner than the light of reason upon a subject, the parts of which we perfectly understand, and which indeed we must understand before it can be made an object of belief under any aspect. If then we should think we find it revealed in Scripture, that one and three were the same mathematical numbers, we ought not to believe it, but should put any other possible construction upon the language, or suppose that this was a human interpolation sooner, or indeed resort to any hypothesis in order to avoid its admission. For human reason is the only guide we have for judging of the evidence of the Bible, and it is not possible that what is a rule and guide in the latter case should fail in the former. And if we can be required to embrace, as an article of faith, any doctrine supposed to be contained in it, which clearly and undeniably contradicts reason, we can be required to suspend the use of this faculty in examining the evidence of the Scriptures themselves, and to believe in their sacred origin and authenticity upon trust altogether.
To this kind of reasoning, I know it is objected, and with some speciousness, that there are some truths, which are acknowledged by all mankind, that are entirely beyond our comprehension; but that we do not allow this circumstance to form any barrier to our belief of them. Such, it is said, is the eternity of God, past and future,—-—his omnipresence and omniscience,—the birth of a child, and growth of a plant,—the action of mind upon matter, &c. These, to be sure, are facts within our knowledge and belief, and such as no one would think of disputing. But the plain distinction which exists between these and the doctrine of the trinity is, that the former, though beyond our reason, are not opposed to it; while the latter clearly is; and this is the reason why we may believe one and should not the other. It is true the human mind is so imperfect, that its powers are not capable of tracing the train of causes and effects which produce these natural results; or of understanding their operation; and indeed, as it regards the eternity of God and his other attributes, of comprehending their full extent. But in these cases there is nothing which contradicts any lore-established and admitted truth in the mind,—nothing which requires us to disbelieve and believe too, at the same time, the same fact, —nothing which obliges us to confide in our reason and disregard it too, at one and the same moment. We believe in the eternity of God; but the truth opposed to this, that he is finite in his existence, we never have believed and are not called upon to believe. We believe in the manner in which we are said to be born into the world; but we are not called upon by our reason to believe that we were born in some other way; and so of all the other truths which are said to be parallel to the doctrine of the trinity, and to receive our ready assent. As it regards the attributes of Deity so far are they from contradicting any of the deductions of reason, that we are obliged to believe them by the very exercise of this reason, though we cannot be said to comprehend them. Take for instance his omnipresence, as we cannot conceive of any limits to the universe, so we cannot conceive of any part of it, which is not under the superintendence of an intelligent Being. And this superintendence being co-extensive with the universe, must necessarily imply a power and knowledge co-extensive with it, or in other words omnipotence and omniscience. The same train of reasoning will apply to his eternity, past and future, that we cannot even conceive of its beginning or end.
There is a great difference in a doctrine’s being beyond human reason and being opposed to it. The one we may and ought often to believe,—the other, from our very nature, we cannot believe; for I assert that it is impossible for any one to believe at the same time two propositions which he perfectly understands, and which to his mind appear to contradict each other. And he must understand them, or he cannot be called upon to believe them, since he must first understand what is meant by one being, and then what is meant by three, or he cannot have any idea of the proposition, that this one and these three beings are the same; and it would be the same thing as requiring him to believe in mere language without any ideas attached to it.
The doctrine of the trinity has been called a mystery, and it may be said that it ought to be received as such, and embraced, although we cannot comprehend it, and although it does appear to contradict the deductions of human reason. But I conceive the term mystery is misunderstood and misapplied, when it is used in application to this doctrine. Mystery, when it relates to doctrines in Scripture language, means, I conceive, nothing more than that they are not thoroughly understood and comprehended by us, as in the case of all the attributes of Deity and the doctrines growing out of them in relation to man,—and when it relates to operations of the Deity or events, it merely means that the mode of operations, or the chain of events, is but partially, or not at all known by us, —as in the case of the growth of a plant and the other examples in respect to operations, —and as in the case of the “Mystical Babylon” in relation perhaps to events. When used in this last sense, it probably means that the design to be accomplished by it, requires that it should be kept a mystery or should not be entirely unravelled, until the time arrives for the accomplishment of this design. But in no case I conceive does it imply a doctrine containing in itself propositions contradictory in their nature, which mankind are required to believe.
The strongest argument against the doctrine of the trinity is, that it contradicts the plainest dictates of human reason, and involves in itself propositions which are directly and utterly opposed to each other. One of these propositions is, that God is a single, independent, and almighty being,—the other is, that he is composed of three distinct persons or agents, united together in some mysterious manner, having but one will and consciousness, and together constituting the divine essence. Now these two are evidently contradictory propositions, and from their very nature destructive of each other. The mathematical proposition, that one and three are the same numbers, is not in itself any more absurd and revolting to reason, than the assertion of both of the foregoing propositions at the same time, but precisely of the same nature and extent; and yet if we were called upon to give our assent to such a proposition, we should say at once, that it was impossible; that the one in its very essence excluded the other and could not co-exist with it. And nothing which could be brought in support of such a proposition, could or ought to induce us to receive it, for we should distrust any kind of evidence sooner than the light of reason upon a subject, the parts of which we perfectly understand, and which indeed we must understand before it can be made an object of belief under any aspect. If then we should think we find it revealed in Scripture, that one and three were the same mathematical numbers, we ought not to believe it, but should put any other possible construction upon the language, or suppose that this was a human interpolation sooner, or indeed resort to any hypothesis in order to avoid its admission. For human reason is the only guide we have for judging of the evidence of the Bible, and it is not possible that what is a rule and guide in the latter case should fail in the former. And if we can be required to embrace, as an article of faith, any doctrine supposed to be contained in it, which clearly and undeniably contradicts reason, we can be required to suspend the use of this faculty in examining the evidence of the Scriptures themselves, and to believe in their sacred origin and authenticity upon trust altogether.
To this kind of reasoning, I know it is objected, and with some speciousness, that there are some truths, which are acknowledged by all mankind, that are entirely beyond our comprehension; but that we do not allow this circumstance to form any barrier to our belief of them. Such, it is said, is the eternity of God, past and future,—-—his omnipresence and omniscience,—the birth of a child, and growth of a plant,—the action of mind upon matter, &c. These, to be sure, are facts within our knowledge and belief, and such as no one would think of disputing. But the plain distinction which exists between these and the doctrine of the trinity is, that the former, though beyond our reason, are not opposed to it; while the latter clearly is; and this is the reason why we may believe one and should not the other. It is true the human mind is so imperfect, that its powers are not capable of tracing the train of causes and effects which produce these natural results; or of understanding their operation; and indeed, as it regards the eternity of God and his other attributes, of comprehending their full extent. But in these cases there is nothing which contradicts any lore-established and admitted truth in the mind,—nothing which requires us to disbelieve and believe too, at the same time, the same fact, —nothing which obliges us to confide in our reason and disregard it too, at one and the same moment. We believe in the eternity of God; but the truth opposed to this, that he is finite in his existence, we never have believed and are not called upon to believe. We believe in the manner in which we are said to be born into the world; but we are not called upon by our reason to believe that we were born in some other way; and so of all the other truths which are said to be parallel to the doctrine of the trinity, and to receive our ready assent. As it regards the attributes of Deity so far are they from contradicting any of the deductions of reason, that we are obliged to believe them by the very exercise of this reason, though we cannot be said to comprehend them. Take for instance his omnipresence, as we cannot conceive of any limits to the universe, so we cannot conceive of any part of it, which is not under the superintendence of an intelligent Being. And this superintendence being co-extensive with the universe, must necessarily imply a power and knowledge co-extensive with it, or in other words omnipotence and omniscience. The same train of reasoning will apply to his eternity, past and future, that we cannot even conceive of its beginning or end.
There is a great difference in a doctrine’s being beyond human reason and being opposed to it. The one we may and ought often to believe,—the other, from our very nature, we cannot believe; for I assert that it is impossible for any one to believe at the same time two propositions which he perfectly understands, and which to his mind appear to contradict each other. And he must understand them, or he cannot be called upon to believe them, since he must first understand what is meant by one being, and then what is meant by three, or he cannot have any idea of the proposition, that this one and these three beings are the same; and it would be the same thing as requiring him to believe in mere language without any ideas attached to it.
The doctrine of the trinity has been called a mystery, and it may be said that it ought to be received as such, and embraced, although we cannot comprehend it, and although it does appear to contradict the deductions of human reason. But I conceive the term mystery is misunderstood and misapplied, when it is used in application to this doctrine. Mystery, when it relates to doctrines in Scripture language, means, I conceive, nothing more than that they are not thoroughly understood and comprehended by us, as in the case of all the attributes of Deity and the doctrines growing out of them in relation to man,—and when it relates to operations of the Deity or events, it merely means that the mode of operations, or the chain of events, is but partially, or not at all known by us, —as in the case of the growth of a plant and the other examples in respect to operations, —and as in the case of the “Mystical Babylon” in relation perhaps to events. When used in this last sense, it probably means that the design to be accomplished by it, requires that it should be kept a mystery or should not be entirely unravelled, until the time arrives for the accomplishment of this design. But in no case I conceive does it imply a doctrine containing in itself propositions contradictory in their nature, which mankind are required to believe.
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