The Trinity Doctrine Embarrassed with Numerous Difficulties by Alvin Lamson 1828
The doctrine of the Trinity is embarrassed with numerous difficulties, and these difficulties multiply and strengthen, in proportion as its several parts and appendages are brought distinctly into view. The hypothesis of two natures in Jesus Christ we deem one of its heaviest encumbrances. The trinity supposes the truth of this hypothesis; it may be said, in fact, to rest upon it as its basis, and with it must stand or fall. This circumstance has not, we fear, received the attention it deserves. It is true that the advocates for the strict and proper unity of the Divine Being, have occasionally argued from the absurdity of ascribing to an individual a finite and an infinite nature, but the argument has not been urged with due frequency and earnestness. For ourselves, we place great reliance upon it; it has a force, we think, which is not easily resisted; and could we bring no other, we should consider this alone sufficient to put the question of the truth or falsehood of opposite views at rest for ever.
Let us carefully weigh the doctrine of a double nature in Jesus Christ; let us see to what it amounts, and take a view of some of the chief objections to it. But first, let us glance at its origin and history in the early ages of the church.
We gather from ancient records, that the great bulk of plain unlettered believers, who derived their knowledge of Christianity from its first preachers and their immediate successors, viewed Jesus as a finite and dependent being. That this is true of the whole body of Jewish Christians, during their existence as a church, admits of no doubt. The uneducated Gentile converts, whose minds were not fettered by the prejudices of learning, partook of the same views. The doctrine of Christ's proper divinity appears to have encountered from them the sternest opposition; they dreaded it on account of its supposed impiety, thinking, that it infringed on the supremacy of the Father, and it was not till it had sustained severe and protracted struggles, that it finally obtained currency.
The learned converts from Paganism are entitled to the credit of introducing it. These converts, several of them at least, came fresh from the schools of Alexandria in Egypt, where they had become deeply imbued with the doctrines of the later Platonists, and on embracing Christianity took along with them the sentiments there imbibed. The consequence was, that as early as the former part of the second century, the religion of Jesus began to be corrupted, and its simple truths became disfigured, by an unnatural union with a speculative and earth-born philosophy.
Justin Martyr, A. D. 140, led the way by transferring the Platonic doctrine of the divine reason (logos) to Christianity. This reason, originally considered an attribute of the Father, he converted into a proper person, making it to constitute the divine nature of Jesus. The first step having been taken, further innovations followed, and the work of corruption soon went on apace. It was aided in its progress by Clemens of Alexandria, A.D. 192, and especially by Origen, A.D. 230, a man of subtle and fervid genius, but of an extravagant imagination, and weak judgment, and a very prolific writer. The fame of Origen attracted numerous followers, who, afterwards dispersing into various parts, "everywhere," to use an expression of the learned Brucker, "sowed the field of God with tares."
The doctrine of the trinity, however, as explained by the Fathers of the first three centuries, we feel authorized to say, was very different from the modern orthodox doctrine. The perfect equality of the Son with the Father they never dreamed of asserting. Justin Martyr, as the complexion of his whole language testifies, evidently held the belief of his strict and proper inferiority; and such seems to have been the faith of all the christian writers of any celebrity before the Council of Nice, A.D. 325. It is unnecessary to adduce passages in corroboration of this statement, as its truth has been admitted by several learned trinitarians best acquainted with the writings of christian antiquity. Among those who have conceded it fully, or in substance, it is sufficient to mention the learned Jesuit Petavius, and Cudworth, the profound author of the "Intellectual System," both orthodox authorities.
The Fathers of the Council of Nice asserted the divinity of the Son, but not his individual identity with the Father. He was consubstantial, as they expressed it, with the Father, that is, as they understood it, was in all respects similar, partook of the same specific nature, though not of the same numerical essence; as one man is of the same substance, or species, with another, though possessing distinct individuality. The Councils of Ephesus, A.D. 431, and Chalcedon, A.D. 451, occasioned by the controversies of the Nestorians and Eutychians, the former of whom were accused of dividing the person, and the latter of confounding the natures, of Jesus Christ, appear to have succeeded but little better than that of Nice in defining his divinity, though they undertook to determine the nature and results of its union with humanity. The Council of Chalcedon, particularly, claims the merit of having ascertained and settled the doctrine of the incarnation, which, according to its creed, is in substance as follows. Jesus Christ is truly God and man, perfect in both natures, consubstantial with the Father with respect to his divinity, and consubstantial with us with respect to his humanity; the two natures, the divine and human, are indissolubly united in him without confusion or change, each retaining all its former attributes, yet so united as to form one person.
The doctrine of the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Jesus Christ, as held by the orthodox of succeeding ages, and received by trinitarians of the present day, does not differ in any important particulars from that established by the council of Chalcedon, except, perhaps, that the term consubstantial, which the Fathers of that council, to preserve consistency, must have explained to mean only a specific, would be understood by the moderns to express an individual or numerical identity.
Dr Barrow, one of the most distinguished of the old English divines, thus expresses himself on the subject. "We may, with the holy Fathers, and particularly with the great council of Chalcedon, assert, that in the incarnation of our Lord, the two natures, the divine and human, were united, without any confusion or commixtion; for such a way of blending would induce a third nature different from both; such a commixtion being supposed, our Lord would be neither God nor man, but another third kind of substance, that would destroy, diminish, or alter the properties of each; which is unsound to say, and impossible to be; wherefore both natures in this mystery do subsist entire, distinct, and unconfused, each retaining its essential and natural properties."
After some further remarks of a similar character, he adds, "The natures were joined undividedly;—there is but one Christ, one person, to whom, being God, and being man, are truly and properly attributed."
"The same person never ceased to be both God and man; not even then, when our Lord as man did undergo death; for he raised himself from the dead, he reared the temple of his own body, being fallen; as being God, he was able to raise himself, as being man, he was capable of being ra sed by himself; the union between God and man persisting, when the union between human body and soul was dissolved."*
The church of England, following in the steps of the unreformed Catholic church, determines that, "the Son —took man's nature—so that two whole and perfect natures, that is to say, the Godhead and manhood were joined together in one person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, very God and very man." Art. sec.— It is added by an expositor, "the essential properties of one nature were not communicated to the other nature —each kept his respective properties distinct, without the least confusion in their most intimate union." [Prettyman, Elements of Christian Theology, Vol. ii.]
"In whatever way," says Professor Stuart, "the union of the two natures as effected, it neither destroyed nor essentially changed either the divine or the human nature." He supposes Christ to be "God omniscient and omnipotent; and still a feeble man of imperfect knowledge."
It is unnecessary to add more to show what the received opinion on this subject is.—The doctrine of the Union of the two natures in the person of Jesus Christ, in the form in which it is stated in the above extracts, is admitted, as far as we know, by all genuine trinitarians. No one of them doubts that Christ was perfect man; no one of them professes to doubt that he was also perfect God. According to this doctrine, when fairly stated, an infinite nature with all its essential attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, necessary and everlasting existence, incapable of suffering or change, was indissolubly united in the person of Jesus Christ, with a finite nature, with all its properties, as imperfect knowledge, weakness, exposure to sorrow, pain, and death, in such a manner, that the two natures remain for ever distinct, each retaining unaltered all its former attributes.
Now to this extraordinary doctrine we have several strong objections. Before proceeding to state them, however, we will pause to make one observation suggested by the foregoing narrative. It is this: There is a strong antecedent probability, that the doctrine will be found, upon examination, to be equally unsupported by scripture and by reason. It appears from ecclesiastical history that the simple and unlearned Christians of the earlier and purer ages of the church knew nothing about it; that the first traces of it are found among the learned Platonizing converts; that its features were at first rude and imperfect; that it from time to time received modifications and additions as the disciples of the Egyptian, philosophy, the most absurd that ever disgraced the human intellect, flowed into the church; that it was long opposed on account of its antichristian tendency; that so late as the end of the third century, it had not succeeded in eradicating from the minds of the generality of Christians, learned or unlearned, the great doctrine of the inferior and derived nature of the Son; and finally, that it gathered strength and was matured amid storms of controversy, at a time when the principles of sound criticism and just reasoning had fallen into contempt. That such a doctrine, growing up with the worst philosophy of the worst times, should originally have sprung from the bosom of Christianity, and not from the vicious systems of human speculation, in the midst of which it was nurtured, that it should have remained hidden for years in the records of our Saviour's instructions, and the writings of his apostles, and its existence there not have been suspected till the Alexandrian Platonists pointed it out, is a supposition altogether too extravagant for credit. Its late rise, in union with the philosophical jargon of the age, to which it was wedded, and from which it was content to borrow its terms and illustrations, renders it difficult, if not impossible, for us to believe, that it was one of the truths, which either our Saviour or his apostles were commissioned to impart to the world. In tracing its history, indeed, we gather, at every step, evidence of its human and earthly origin.
Our principal objections to the orthodox distinction of two natures in Jesus Christ are, that it involves an absurdity; that it destroys the personal unity of Jesus, and introduces strange perplexity into our conceptions of his character; that it exposes him to the charge of equivocation and dishonesty; that it destroys the efficacy of his example, and nullifies his instructions; that it is unnecessary, and fails of the object for which it is alleged to be wanted; that it thus carries with it irresistible evidence of its falsehood, it bears all the marks of a most improbable and extravagant fiction; and finally, that after the most careful search, we find no traces of it in the sacred writings.
In the first place, we think that the doctrine of two natures in Jesus Christ, as held by its advocates, is absurd, and consequently that no evidence whatever would be sufficient to establish it. Before we believe it, we must abandon the use of our understandings; we must free ourselves from a disposition to weigh evidence; we must have the convenient pliancy of mind, the happy facility of belief, to which the good father had attained, when he said, "I believe, because it is impossible." If we reflect for a moment on the qualities of the divine and human natures, we must, one would think, be convinced, that they can never be united in the same mind or person. They are absolutely incompatible with each other; they cannot possibly exist together in the same intelligent agent. What are the attributes of the divine and human natures? God is infinite, everlasting, immutable, omnipotent, omniscient, and infallible. Man is finite, limited in knowledge and power, weak, erring, subject to vicissitude, disease, and death. Now, let any one, who ventures to use his understanding, say whether these qualities are compatible with each other. For ourselves, we think they are such, that their union in the same being is naturally impossible. It is the union of infinite and finite, of knowledge and ignorance, of power and weakness, of perfection and imperfection. We may as well talk of the union of light and darkness, or of any two qualities, of which the one necessarily implies the negation or absence of the other.
What is the consequence of the union of divine and human attributes in the same mind or being, on the supposition, admitted by trinitarians, that the two natures remain distinct, none of the qualities of either being lost or changed? Why, that a being may be at the same time infinite and finite; that he may be omnipotent, yet partake of weakness and infirmity, and be unable of himself to do all things; that he may be omniscient, yet be ignorant of many things; that he may be the Author of the universe, yet a wailing infant, wrapped in swaddling clothes, and lying in a manger; a being incapable of pain and suffering, yet a man of sorrows, who expired on the cross, was placed in a shroud, and slept in the tomb. Now if this be not contradiction and absurdity, we confess we know not what contradiction and absurdity are.
We do not think our opponents very fortunate in their attempts to illustrate the doctrine of two natures in Jesus Christ by comparison. Thus we are told, that for an explanation of it we must look into ourselves, and consider the union of soul and body in man; "for as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ." Such is the language of the Athanasian creed. The comparison it suggests has been a favorite one with the assertors of the theological doctrine of the incarnation, from the time this doctrine came into vogue to the present day. That such has been the fact, we think a remarkable instance of the effect of hereditary prejudices in blinding the understanding, and of the lamentable weakness of human nature, which induces men to listen to flimsy argument and mere sophistry, when employed in the support of received opinions.
The comparison of the two natures of Jesus Christ with the union of spirit and body in ourselves, may serve to introduce confusion and darkness into a person's ideas, in consequence of which he may lose sight of the absurdity of the hypothesis, which it is meant to illustrate;— perhaps he may think, that he has, at length, hit upon a parallel, which solves all difficulties. But a little sober reflection, we think, must abate his confidence. To us the two cases appear totally dissimilar. Man is a complex being, very different from that compound being, which Christ is represented by our adversaries to be. If you admit the common distinction, and say that man is made up of matter and spirit, and then inquire what is his nature, the only general and intelligible answer to this inquiry is, that it is those properties, corporeal and mental, which result from his constitution and physical organization; that is, all those qualities, which constitute him what in his present state he is. Now it cannot be said, that any of these qualities are incompatible with others. There is nothing in any of them, which makes it a contradiction or absurdity to suppose, that they may all exist together in the same subject. You may, indeed, affirm of apart, what is not true of the whole of man. You may say of his body, that it has extension and solidity, and attribute to his mind perception, memory, judgment; but here is no contradiction. You do not attribute to him, as an individual or whole, opposite qualities. You do not ascribe to his person qualities or acts so utterly repugnant, that one necessarily excludes the other, as light excludes darkness, or omnipotence, weakness. Our objection to the union of two natures in the person of Jesus Christ, is, that it brings together an assemblage of qualities, which are incompatible with each other that it ascribes to Christ, as an individual or person, properties between which there is such an utter repugnance, such direct opposition, that they cannot exist together in the same subject. Trinitarians affirm, that Christ is perfect God and perfect man; consequently he must have all the qualities of both, as omnipotence and weakness, infallibility and fallibility, infinite knowledge and limited and partial information; and these qualities are affirmed of him in a personal character. Man presents no phenomenon resembling this; no such combination of incongruous and opposite qualities.
To say of Christ, that he is divine and human, infinite and finite, omnipotent and weak, is to assert nothing more strange or mysterious, it is contended, than to affirm of man that he is mortal and immortal. But the fallacy of this statement is quite obvious. The expressions in question do not belong to the same class, nor have they any real, but only a seeming resemblance. When we say that man is mortal and immortal, we do not employ terms, which, in the connexion in which they stand, have any opposition or repugnance; they are not, in fact, opposites; they convey no incompatible ideas. What we affirm in one part of the proposition we do not deny in the other. By the assertion, man is mortal, we mean that his present mode of existence will cease, and by the assertion that he is immortal, we mean that he will continue in being for ever. The two assertions are distinct, but not opposed. We affirm simply that man will undergo a change at death, but that this change will not amount to an absolute annihilation of his being, and in this proposition there is nothing contradictory or absurd.—A similar explanation may be given of numerous other propositions, in which the same thing is apparently affirmed and denied of the same subject. The terms in different parts of the proposition either change their signification, or they are used in senses not really, but only apparently opposed. The same solution, however, does not apply to the proposition, Christ is finite and infinite, for the terms here employed are by their nature wholly opposed, and undergo no change of signification in the different parts of the proposition. We affirm, in one breath, that he is finite and not finite, God and not God, the terms, the whole time, being used in the same sense, and thus fall into as palpable a contradiction as could be uttered.
The doctrine of the Trinity is embarrassed with numerous difficulties, and these difficulties multiply and strengthen, in proportion as its several parts and appendages are brought distinctly into view. The hypothesis of two natures in Jesus Christ we deem one of its heaviest encumbrances. The trinity supposes the truth of this hypothesis; it may be said, in fact, to rest upon it as its basis, and with it must stand or fall. This circumstance has not, we fear, received the attention it deserves. It is true that the advocates for the strict and proper unity of the Divine Being, have occasionally argued from the absurdity of ascribing to an individual a finite and an infinite nature, but the argument has not been urged with due frequency and earnestness. For ourselves, we place great reliance upon it; it has a force, we think, which is not easily resisted; and could we bring no other, we should consider this alone sufficient to put the question of the truth or falsehood of opposite views at rest for ever.
Let us carefully weigh the doctrine of a double nature in Jesus Christ; let us see to what it amounts, and take a view of some of the chief objections to it. But first, let us glance at its origin and history in the early ages of the church.
We gather from ancient records, that the great bulk of plain unlettered believers, who derived their knowledge of Christianity from its first preachers and their immediate successors, viewed Jesus as a finite and dependent being. That this is true of the whole body of Jewish Christians, during their existence as a church, admits of no doubt. The uneducated Gentile converts, whose minds were not fettered by the prejudices of learning, partook of the same views. The doctrine of Christ's proper divinity appears to have encountered from them the sternest opposition; they dreaded it on account of its supposed impiety, thinking, that it infringed on the supremacy of the Father, and it was not till it had sustained severe and protracted struggles, that it finally obtained currency.
The learned converts from Paganism are entitled to the credit of introducing it. These converts, several of them at least, came fresh from the schools of Alexandria in Egypt, where they had become deeply imbued with the doctrines of the later Platonists, and on embracing Christianity took along with them the sentiments there imbibed. The consequence was, that as early as the former part of the second century, the religion of Jesus began to be corrupted, and its simple truths became disfigured, by an unnatural union with a speculative and earth-born philosophy.
Justin Martyr, A. D. 140, led the way by transferring the Platonic doctrine of the divine reason (logos) to Christianity. This reason, originally considered an attribute of the Father, he converted into a proper person, making it to constitute the divine nature of Jesus. The first step having been taken, further innovations followed, and the work of corruption soon went on apace. It was aided in its progress by Clemens of Alexandria, A.D. 192, and especially by Origen, A.D. 230, a man of subtle and fervid genius, but of an extravagant imagination, and weak judgment, and a very prolific writer. The fame of Origen attracted numerous followers, who, afterwards dispersing into various parts, "everywhere," to use an expression of the learned Brucker, "sowed the field of God with tares."
The doctrine of the trinity, however, as explained by the Fathers of the first three centuries, we feel authorized to say, was very different from the modern orthodox doctrine. The perfect equality of the Son with the Father they never dreamed of asserting. Justin Martyr, as the complexion of his whole language testifies, evidently held the belief of his strict and proper inferiority; and such seems to have been the faith of all the christian writers of any celebrity before the Council of Nice, A.D. 325. It is unnecessary to adduce passages in corroboration of this statement, as its truth has been admitted by several learned trinitarians best acquainted with the writings of christian antiquity. Among those who have conceded it fully, or in substance, it is sufficient to mention the learned Jesuit Petavius, and Cudworth, the profound author of the "Intellectual System," both orthodox authorities.
The Fathers of the Council of Nice asserted the divinity of the Son, but not his individual identity with the Father. He was consubstantial, as they expressed it, with the Father, that is, as they understood it, was in all respects similar, partook of the same specific nature, though not of the same numerical essence; as one man is of the same substance, or species, with another, though possessing distinct individuality. The Councils of Ephesus, A.D. 431, and Chalcedon, A.D. 451, occasioned by the controversies of the Nestorians and Eutychians, the former of whom were accused of dividing the person, and the latter of confounding the natures, of Jesus Christ, appear to have succeeded but little better than that of Nice in defining his divinity, though they undertook to determine the nature and results of its union with humanity. The Council of Chalcedon, particularly, claims the merit of having ascertained and settled the doctrine of the incarnation, which, according to its creed, is in substance as follows. Jesus Christ is truly God and man, perfect in both natures, consubstantial with the Father with respect to his divinity, and consubstantial with us with respect to his humanity; the two natures, the divine and human, are indissolubly united in him without confusion or change, each retaining all its former attributes, yet so united as to form one person.
The doctrine of the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Jesus Christ, as held by the orthodox of succeeding ages, and received by trinitarians of the present day, does not differ in any important particulars from that established by the council of Chalcedon, except, perhaps, that the term consubstantial, which the Fathers of that council, to preserve consistency, must have explained to mean only a specific, would be understood by the moderns to express an individual or numerical identity.
Dr Barrow, one of the most distinguished of the old English divines, thus expresses himself on the subject. "We may, with the holy Fathers, and particularly with the great council of Chalcedon, assert, that in the incarnation of our Lord, the two natures, the divine and human, were united, without any confusion or commixtion; for such a way of blending would induce a third nature different from both; such a commixtion being supposed, our Lord would be neither God nor man, but another third kind of substance, that would destroy, diminish, or alter the properties of each; which is unsound to say, and impossible to be; wherefore both natures in this mystery do subsist entire, distinct, and unconfused, each retaining its essential and natural properties."
After some further remarks of a similar character, he adds, "The natures were joined undividedly;—there is but one Christ, one person, to whom, being God, and being man, are truly and properly attributed."
"The same person never ceased to be both God and man; not even then, when our Lord as man did undergo death; for he raised himself from the dead, he reared the temple of his own body, being fallen; as being God, he was able to raise himself, as being man, he was capable of being ra sed by himself; the union between God and man persisting, when the union between human body and soul was dissolved."*
The church of England, following in the steps of the unreformed Catholic church, determines that, "the Son —took man's nature—so that two whole and perfect natures, that is to say, the Godhead and manhood were joined together in one person, never to be divided, whereof is one Christ, very God and very man." Art. sec.— It is added by an expositor, "the essential properties of one nature were not communicated to the other nature —each kept his respective properties distinct, without the least confusion in their most intimate union." [Prettyman, Elements of Christian Theology, Vol. ii.]
"In whatever way," says Professor Stuart, "the union of the two natures as effected, it neither destroyed nor essentially changed either the divine or the human nature." He supposes Christ to be "God omniscient and omnipotent; and still a feeble man of imperfect knowledge."
It is unnecessary to add more to show what the received opinion on this subject is.—The doctrine of the Union of the two natures in the person of Jesus Christ, in the form in which it is stated in the above extracts, is admitted, as far as we know, by all genuine trinitarians. No one of them doubts that Christ was perfect man; no one of them professes to doubt that he was also perfect God. According to this doctrine, when fairly stated, an infinite nature with all its essential attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, necessary and everlasting existence, incapable of suffering or change, was indissolubly united in the person of Jesus Christ, with a finite nature, with all its properties, as imperfect knowledge, weakness, exposure to sorrow, pain, and death, in such a manner, that the two natures remain for ever distinct, each retaining unaltered all its former attributes.
Now to this extraordinary doctrine we have several strong objections. Before proceeding to state them, however, we will pause to make one observation suggested by the foregoing narrative. It is this: There is a strong antecedent probability, that the doctrine will be found, upon examination, to be equally unsupported by scripture and by reason. It appears from ecclesiastical history that the simple and unlearned Christians of the earlier and purer ages of the church knew nothing about it; that the first traces of it are found among the learned Platonizing converts; that its features were at first rude and imperfect; that it from time to time received modifications and additions as the disciples of the Egyptian, philosophy, the most absurd that ever disgraced the human intellect, flowed into the church; that it was long opposed on account of its antichristian tendency; that so late as the end of the third century, it had not succeeded in eradicating from the minds of the generality of Christians, learned or unlearned, the great doctrine of the inferior and derived nature of the Son; and finally, that it gathered strength and was matured amid storms of controversy, at a time when the principles of sound criticism and just reasoning had fallen into contempt. That such a doctrine, growing up with the worst philosophy of the worst times, should originally have sprung from the bosom of Christianity, and not from the vicious systems of human speculation, in the midst of which it was nurtured, that it should have remained hidden for years in the records of our Saviour's instructions, and the writings of his apostles, and its existence there not have been suspected till the Alexandrian Platonists pointed it out, is a supposition altogether too extravagant for credit. Its late rise, in union with the philosophical jargon of the age, to which it was wedded, and from which it was content to borrow its terms and illustrations, renders it difficult, if not impossible, for us to believe, that it was one of the truths, which either our Saviour or his apostles were commissioned to impart to the world. In tracing its history, indeed, we gather, at every step, evidence of its human and earthly origin.
Our principal objections to the orthodox distinction of two natures in Jesus Christ are, that it involves an absurdity; that it destroys the personal unity of Jesus, and introduces strange perplexity into our conceptions of his character; that it exposes him to the charge of equivocation and dishonesty; that it destroys the efficacy of his example, and nullifies his instructions; that it is unnecessary, and fails of the object for which it is alleged to be wanted; that it thus carries with it irresistible evidence of its falsehood, it bears all the marks of a most improbable and extravagant fiction; and finally, that after the most careful search, we find no traces of it in the sacred writings.
In the first place, we think that the doctrine of two natures in Jesus Christ, as held by its advocates, is absurd, and consequently that no evidence whatever would be sufficient to establish it. Before we believe it, we must abandon the use of our understandings; we must free ourselves from a disposition to weigh evidence; we must have the convenient pliancy of mind, the happy facility of belief, to which the good father had attained, when he said, "I believe, because it is impossible." If we reflect for a moment on the qualities of the divine and human natures, we must, one would think, be convinced, that they can never be united in the same mind or person. They are absolutely incompatible with each other; they cannot possibly exist together in the same intelligent agent. What are the attributes of the divine and human natures? God is infinite, everlasting, immutable, omnipotent, omniscient, and infallible. Man is finite, limited in knowledge and power, weak, erring, subject to vicissitude, disease, and death. Now, let any one, who ventures to use his understanding, say whether these qualities are compatible with each other. For ourselves, we think they are such, that their union in the same being is naturally impossible. It is the union of infinite and finite, of knowledge and ignorance, of power and weakness, of perfection and imperfection. We may as well talk of the union of light and darkness, or of any two qualities, of which the one necessarily implies the negation or absence of the other.
What is the consequence of the union of divine and human attributes in the same mind or being, on the supposition, admitted by trinitarians, that the two natures remain distinct, none of the qualities of either being lost or changed? Why, that a being may be at the same time infinite and finite; that he may be omnipotent, yet partake of weakness and infirmity, and be unable of himself to do all things; that he may be omniscient, yet be ignorant of many things; that he may be the Author of the universe, yet a wailing infant, wrapped in swaddling clothes, and lying in a manger; a being incapable of pain and suffering, yet a man of sorrows, who expired on the cross, was placed in a shroud, and slept in the tomb. Now if this be not contradiction and absurdity, we confess we know not what contradiction and absurdity are.
We do not think our opponents very fortunate in their attempts to illustrate the doctrine of two natures in Jesus Christ by comparison. Thus we are told, that for an explanation of it we must look into ourselves, and consider the union of soul and body in man; "for as the reasonable soul and flesh is one man, so God and man is one Christ." Such is the language of the Athanasian creed. The comparison it suggests has been a favorite one with the assertors of the theological doctrine of the incarnation, from the time this doctrine came into vogue to the present day. That such has been the fact, we think a remarkable instance of the effect of hereditary prejudices in blinding the understanding, and of the lamentable weakness of human nature, which induces men to listen to flimsy argument and mere sophistry, when employed in the support of received opinions.
The comparison of the two natures of Jesus Christ with the union of spirit and body in ourselves, may serve to introduce confusion and darkness into a person's ideas, in consequence of which he may lose sight of the absurdity of the hypothesis, which it is meant to illustrate;— perhaps he may think, that he has, at length, hit upon a parallel, which solves all difficulties. But a little sober reflection, we think, must abate his confidence. To us the two cases appear totally dissimilar. Man is a complex being, very different from that compound being, which Christ is represented by our adversaries to be. If you admit the common distinction, and say that man is made up of matter and spirit, and then inquire what is his nature, the only general and intelligible answer to this inquiry is, that it is those properties, corporeal and mental, which result from his constitution and physical organization; that is, all those qualities, which constitute him what in his present state he is. Now it cannot be said, that any of these qualities are incompatible with others. There is nothing in any of them, which makes it a contradiction or absurdity to suppose, that they may all exist together in the same subject. You may, indeed, affirm of apart, what is not true of the whole of man. You may say of his body, that it has extension and solidity, and attribute to his mind perception, memory, judgment; but here is no contradiction. You do not attribute to him, as an individual or whole, opposite qualities. You do not ascribe to his person qualities or acts so utterly repugnant, that one necessarily excludes the other, as light excludes darkness, or omnipotence, weakness. Our objection to the union of two natures in the person of Jesus Christ, is, that it brings together an assemblage of qualities, which are incompatible with each other that it ascribes to Christ, as an individual or person, properties between which there is such an utter repugnance, such direct opposition, that they cannot exist together in the same subject. Trinitarians affirm, that Christ is perfect God and perfect man; consequently he must have all the qualities of both, as omnipotence and weakness, infallibility and fallibility, infinite knowledge and limited and partial information; and these qualities are affirmed of him in a personal character. Man presents no phenomenon resembling this; no such combination of incongruous and opposite qualities.
To say of Christ, that he is divine and human, infinite and finite, omnipotent and weak, is to assert nothing more strange or mysterious, it is contended, than to affirm of man that he is mortal and immortal. But the fallacy of this statement is quite obvious. The expressions in question do not belong to the same class, nor have they any real, but only a seeming resemblance. When we say that man is mortal and immortal, we do not employ terms, which, in the connexion in which they stand, have any opposition or repugnance; they are not, in fact, opposites; they convey no incompatible ideas. What we affirm in one part of the proposition we do not deny in the other. By the assertion, man is mortal, we mean that his present mode of existence will cease, and by the assertion that he is immortal, we mean that he will continue in being for ever. The two assertions are distinct, but not opposed. We affirm simply that man will undergo a change at death, but that this change will not amount to an absolute annihilation of his being, and in this proposition there is nothing contradictory or absurd.—A similar explanation may be given of numerous other propositions, in which the same thing is apparently affirmed and denied of the same subject. The terms in different parts of the proposition either change their signification, or they are used in senses not really, but only apparently opposed. The same solution, however, does not apply to the proposition, Christ is finite and infinite, for the terms here employed are by their nature wholly opposed, and undergo no change of signification in the different parts of the proposition. We affirm, in one breath, that he is finite and not finite, God and not God, the terms, the whole time, being used in the same sense, and thus fall into as palpable a contradiction as could be uttered.
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