Tuesday, March 20, 2018

Alternate (Unitarian) Interpretations of John 20:28


Alternate Interpretations of John 20:28, article in The Christian Life 1883

THE EXCLAMATION OF ST. THOMAS

["Thomas answered and said to him, 'My Lord!' and, 'My God!'"—John 20:28.]

The double difficulty which, as we have seen, attends the common theory, that Thomas here proclaimed the Deity of Christ, has led to various other interpretations, which we must now proceed to consider.

The orthodox [Gottfried Christian Friedrich] Lücke, in his commentary on John (2. 504), remarks that "the uncertain meaning of theos in this connection does not allow us to deduce from Thomas's mode of address any argument for the strict deity of Christ." For both in Greek and in Hebrew the word "God" admits of being used at times in a looser and weaker meaning than is permissible in modern languages. This may be seen in Psalm 110:1, and in John 10:34-35; and one or two striking instances occur even in later Christian literature. Thus in the Epistle to Diognetus, in the second century, we read that a donor "becomes a God to those who receive" his gifts; and the Apostolical Constitutions (2, 26) call the bishop "a God upon earth"—Epigeios Theos. In the case of Thomas's exclamation, such an interpretation is rendered additionally easy by the presence of the limiting word "my." Hence the Trinitarian scholar Michaelis (Anmerkungen in loc), pointing out the difficulty of supposing Thomas to have passed, in an instant, from extreme doubt to a height of belief which no other disciple attained till long afterwards, maintains that the ejaculation, uttered as it was in a moment of intense wonder, should be understood "metaphorically" (figurlich); as possibly meaning, for instance, "whom I shall ever most highly venerate." So, too, Kuinoel considers theos to be used here in the same way as in John 10:33. The same view is said to be taken by [Heinrich Eduard?]Schmieder (Hohep. Gebet. s. 14); but I have not been able to refer to his book. A similar interpretation is given by the Trinitarian Rosenmuller, and the Unitarians Yates, Norton, and Wakefield; who suppose Thomas to have had in view the specific character of the Messiah as being the earthly representative of God.

Some writers, however, have treated the matter in an entirely different manner, and have avoided both the difficulty of supposing Christ to have been then addressed as "Theos," and also the counter-difficulty of giving "Theos "an unusual signification, by regarding that word as having been addressed to the Father, and not to Christ at all. It has been objected to this view that the Jews were not guilty, like modern Frenchmen and Germans, of the profanity of taking God's name in vain in everyday conversation. But the remark is surely irrelevant. We are dealing here with no ordinary moment, but with a supreme religious crisis; and Thomas's words are no conversational, "mon dieu" or "gott-lob, but a solemn apostrophe like, end perhaps in the very words of, the "Adonai Elohai of Gideon's cry (Judg. 6:22).

Of the writers who take this view, some treat the verse as recording not a single consecutive exclamation, but two independent ones, "My Lord!" again and "My God!;" Thomas first recognising with awe the identity of his risen master, and then breaking forth into an apostrophe of gratitude to the Father who had raised him from the dead. This arrangement of the verse, which is adopted by Milton and by W. J. Fox, is to some extent confirmed by the repetition of the 'my,'a repetition which seems meaningless unless two persons were addressed. Too much stress must not be laid on this argument with such an instance to the contrary as Ps. 35:23, "My God and my Lord." But it cannot fairly be denied that the usual effect of such a repetition is to suggest a duality of persons; as when Southey says,—

"Patiently, his crown resigned, 
 He fixed on heaven his heavenly mind; 
  Blessing, as he kissed the rod, 
  His Redeemer and his God."

Similarly, when we find Dr. Watts addressing Christ as

"My dear Redeemer and my Lord,"

we are conscious of an nnnaturalnesa in the repetition of the "my," which nothing but the exigencies of metre can excuse.

This view is rejected, though somewhat hesitatingly, by Rosenmuller, on the ground that the 'and' seems to connect the two epithets and refer them to one person. But it may be doubted whether the 'and' has necessarily this force, even if we regard it as being (as the printers of our English Bible make it), one of the words which Thomas himself uttered. And if, on the other hand, it be (as the Greek MSS. will equally well permit) a conjunction inserted by the historian John, between two separate exclamations, then the very care taken by John thus to mark them as separate utterances would point to his having regarded them as having separate objects.

Milton's view of the passage may not improbably be as old as the time of Theodore of Mopsuestia, who certainly rejected the common interpretation of the passage. But Theodore's words are not free from ambiguity, nor are they recorded with perfect precision. He is usually regarded as having taken the still bolder course of treating the words of Thomas as a single unbroken apostrophe to the Father, no part of it being addressed to Christ at all. In modern times this same view has been adopted by Paulus and (but I cannot learn where) by Fritzsche. An objection to it lies in the fact that John expressly represents the words as said "to him," i.e., to Christ. To remove this objection it has been pointed out that a similar phrase has, on some rare occasions, been used of a person on account of whose words something is said, although it is not said to him personally. Thus in 1 Sam. 20:12, "Jonathan said unto David, 0 Lord God of Israel! when," &c; Bo, too, John 14:23, and perhaps Luke 14:23 may be cited as parallel.

It will, I think, be seen from this resume' of the various interpretations of the verse that every one of them is attended with some difficulty of its own. Doubtless all embarrassment would vanish if we possessed a fuller record of what was said and done; for it must be remembered that John's account is only a compressed one. As Professor Westcott says (John, p. lvii.), "It is undeniable that the discourses of the Lord which are peculiar to St. John's Gospel are, for the most part, very brief summaries. . . . It is wholly out of the question that they can be literally complete reports. The evangelist . . . has not given as all the words which were actually spoken, and this being so, it follows that he cannot have given the exact words, or only the words, which were spoken. Compression involves adaptation of phraseology. He adds examples, not only of discourses, but also of conversations, in which this condensation has evidently taken place; nor is this all. If as seems surely to be established, most of the discourses recorded by St. John were spoken in Aramaic, the record of the evangelist contains not only a compressed summary of what was said, but that also a summary in a translation."

Thursday, March 15, 2018

Exodus 3:14 as the Most Perverted Translation by John Thompson 1825


Exodus 3:14: The Most Perverted Translation by John Samuel Thompson 1825

John, 8, 58. Jesus said unto them, before Abraham was I am. In this passage two difficulties, are contained which have exercised the pens of commentators and Polemics. The first consists in our Lord's declaration that he was before Abraham. The second in applying to himself the terms I am; by which phrase according to the English translation of the bible, Jehovah designates himself. Let us first take the latter difficulty into consideration.

Moses had asked God his name, and what he should say to the children of Israel, if they enquired from what authority he derived his commission. To which God replied; I Am That I Am. Thus shall thou say to the children of Israel; I am hath sent me unto you." Ex. 3, 14. No text of scripture was ever more perverted by a wrong translation, than this in Exodus. The original Hebrew stands thus; "I will be who I will be;" or perhaps more properly, 'I will be What I am;" a form of words expressive of the eternal existence & unalterable nature of Jehovah. The Septuagint reads, "I am the existing or "he who exists" "The existing hath sent me." To make therefore, the I am of the Evangelist, a reference to this passage of the Pentateuch is a most idle fancy, unsupported by the original; and what is more to the purpose, it is equally unsupported hy the Septuagint; the text book of the Gospel writers. The Syr. Sam. vers. Sam. Targ. Onk. and Pers. adopt the words as they are in the Hebrew as an appellative without any interpretation. The Arabic has "the Eternal who will never pass away." The Targ. Jon. B. Uz. well expresses the sense by 'I am he who am and will be." But the Vulgate has Ego sum qui sum, from which our translation appears to have been taken. This difficulty is therefore the offspring of mere ignorance. The phrase I am has not the least claim to be esteemed a name of Jehovah. Our translators should have supplied the pronoun he in this verse as in verse 24. Then both texts would have read alike "Before Abraham was I am He." Unless you believe, that I am He, (the Messiah.)

The second difficulty arises from a prolepsis frequent in the phraseology of the New Testament, it was determined in the counsels of Providence before the ages—before Abraham was, that the Messiah should appear; so Christians were selected or pre-ordained before the foundation of the world, Eph. 1:4.5. 2 Tim. 1:9; so the names of the servants of God were written in the book of life from the foundation of the world, Rev. 12:8. 17:8. Events Determined are often described in scripture as accomplished, see Matt. 17:11; 26:45. Heb. 12:22-25. Moreover in this very chapter Abraham's conviction of a future Saviour was so strong, that he is said to have seen the day of his coming as if it had actually arrived. The Targ. Jon. Ben. Uz.with which the Targ.Jerus. corresponds in Gen. 3.24. says, "before the world was created, Jehovah created the Law; he prepared the Garden of Eden for the Just; and Gehennah for the wicked." Such language was customary among the Jews. The interpretation of this passage is easy, before Abraham be I am; or I exist before Abraham: for he never can be really Abraham, till all the families of the earth are blessed in me! Hence Beza here observes that the meaning is, Christ was before Abram in the divine decree: so also Grotius on John 17:5. The Greek phrase Prin abraam genesthai, ego eimi, is correctly translated; before Abraham become, I am. The phrase will then appear elliptical but the ellipsis can be easily supplied; and it then reads thus, before Abraham become the father of many nations, I exist. This interpretation is perfectly easy and natural, the promise to Abraham will be accomplished in his seed which is Christ: and when all the nations are blessed in Christ, Abram will then have become Abraham or the father of many nations; but not till Christ shall have reconciled all nations, and brought them to realize God's promise to that Patriarch. Hence we see that Christ must he before Abraham, and the passage says nothing whatever either about Christ's deity or pre-existence.

How ridiculous must the defenders of Christ's Deity appear on hearing the true meaning of this text!! How contemptible, how unprincipled are those doughty champions ot Orthodoxy, who decide on controverted points of doctrine with the most dogmatical assurance without possessing the first requisite of theological criticism, the ability of consulting, in the original languages, the records of eternal Salvation!!

Plato, Philo & Jesus as "a God" by Paul Wernle 1904


Plato, Philo, and Jesus as "a God" by Paul Wernle 1904 [Professor Extraordinary of Modern Church History at the University of Basle]

From: The Beginnings of Christianity, Volume 2


Angels and demons were the connecting link between the remote God and the visible world for the popular belief. Philosophy substituted the 'Logoi' or the 'Logos' and the Holy Spirit for the angels.

Here Philo had paved the way for the Christians. He himself was a Platonist, feeling himself a stranger in this phenomenal world while his true home was in the world of ideas. He did not introduce the conception of Logos into Jewish thought. Stoic and Aristotelian philosophers had done that before him. But just as he appropriated the work of his Jewish predecessors to a very large extent, even where they followed other Greek philosophers, so he took up the conception of the Logos from this tradition, and adapted it to Platonic modes of thought by defining it more sharply, and by individualizing it both as regards God and as regards the world. Even in Philo we find the Logos called the "second God," and the Old Testament was interpreted with reference to him.

Nor was Philo the only forerunner in this direction.

In the Wisdom of Solomon the spirit of wisdom is described, in accordance with the Stoic doctrine, as an infinitely subtilized, universal reason that pervades everything and is yet distinct from God Himself.

Of Christian writers, St Paul was the first to look upon Christ as such an intermediary being, higher than all the angels, yet lower than God Himself, nor was the term Logos as yet applied to Him. It was no philosophical problem that had moved St Paul to take this view. He wished to find Christ in the whole of the Old Testament. This was only possible by depriving God and the angels of a great portion of the sphere of their activity. Jesus, however, thereby comes to be the God that actively works in the world.

Then the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews developed his Pauline theology by means of conceptions taken directly from Alexandrine sources. The world was created through the Son of God. He is the reflection of God's glory and the impress of His substance, upholding all things by the word of His power. In the 45th Psalm He is called God —of course as Son, i.e., as God in a secondary sense. The very word 'reflection' is used as an attribute of wisdom in the Wisdom of Solomon. But this disciple of Philo did not venture as yet to apply the word 'Logos' to Jesus.

In the prologue of the Fourth Gospel, however, this name appears clearly and unmistakably. "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was a God." Dependence on Philo's writings is possible, yet it is not even absolutely necessary to presuppose it. The cosmological character of the opening sentences clearly points to a philosophical source. Between God and the world stands the Logos. On the one hand He is with God, on the other everything is created by Him. He is called 'a' God, but not 'the' God; in exactly the same way Philo distinguished between God with and God without the article, and supported this distinction by Old Testament proofs. The most suitable name is Son of God, or rather the only Son, in distinction from the 'children' of God, who only become children by His mediation. He is not only the creator of the world but its supporter, as in Him is all life.

Now the fact is of great importance that the man who introduced the Logos into the Gospel was not himself a philosopher, nor did the problem of the mediation between God and the world cause him any anxiety or difficulty. It is for apologetic and not philosophical ends that he makes use of the theory of the Logos. If, therefore, he ascribes a cosmological signification to the Logos, notwithstanding all this, then he must have been determined to do so by a firmly established tradition. It was an accepted theory — derived either from Philo or elsewhere — that the Logos had created and supported the world. The evangelist accepts this view in order to make it the basis for the transition to the apologetic, which is the sole aim of the whole of his prologue.

...And the word was a God by William McGirr 1854


...and the word was a God by William McGirr 1854

Inasmuch as Trinitarians lay great stress upon [John 1:1], to prove the second person in their triune God, which, for the information of my fellow citizens generally who do not understand the Greek language, I will give the original in Greek, with its various definitions in English, taken from the Rev. John Groves' Greek and English Dictionary, viz: "Logos"—a word, speech, language, eloquence, the word, divine word, Christ, an oration, discourse, a saying, proverb, fame, report, rumor, talk, thought, opinion, conception, reflection, reason, understanding, sense, proportion, analogy, account, cause, a computation, reckoning, a matter, affair, point, purpose, an appearance, show, pretence, a volume, book, treatise, a narrative, story, fable, &c.

Now, gentlemen, you may observe that this word has upwards of forty different meanings in English. Supposing I was to translate the first verse of John's Gospel: In the beginning was language, and the language was with God, and the language was God. Again: In the beginning was a [the] report, and the report was with God, and the report was God. Again: In the beginning was a [the] book, and the book was with God, and the book was God. Again: In the beginning was a [the] fable, and the fable was with God, and the fable was God. And so of all the rest of the definitions.

Now this would almost appear to make a confusion of language. I presume, for any person to translate the first verse of John's Gospel: In the beginning was a book or a fable, and the book or fable was with God, and the book or fable was God; be would be viewed by the mass of mankind as insane, commote or delirious. Notwithstanding it would be a good translation. Who would presume to say, that a book or a fable is God?

This appears to me to be a poor foundation to build upon to prove the doctrine of a Trinity. These things I have introduced in order to show the impropriety of laying too much stress upon the meaning of words, translated from a dead language. I may also observe that Dr, Campbell, though a Trinitarian, gives it as his opinion, that either speech, or reason, would be the most proper. Again: I will make one remark upon our translators, in order to show how prejudice can sway the judgment. We must bear in mind that the first definition is "a word." It would then read: In the beginning was a word, and the word was with God, and the word was a God. But mark how they leave the a out, but how carefully they attach it to Moses: "I have made thee a God to Pharaoh." And why so? Because they abhorred the idea of deifying Moses, but they wanted to deify Jesus, to make him the second person of their triune God. So much for poor human nature!

Monday, March 12, 2018

Origen's Subordinationism By Alvan Lamson 1865

 


Origen's Subordinationist Trinity By Alvan Lamson 1865

We now proceed to Origen's views of the Son and Spirit. Like the preceding Fathers, he regarded the Son as the first production of the Father; having emanated from him as light from the sun, and thus partaking of the same substance; that is, a divine. He believed, however, that God and the Son constituted two individual essences, two beings. This belief he distinctly avows in more than one instance, and the general strain of his writings implies it. He disclaims being of the number of those "who deny that the Father and Son are two substances"; and proceeds to assert that they "are two things as to their essence, but one in consent, concord, and identity of will." He quotes the Saviour's words, "I and my Father are one," which he explains as referring solely to unity of will and affection; and refers, in illustration, to Acts iv. 32: "And the multitude of them that believed were of one heart and one soul." Again: from the circumstance that Jesus is called "light" in the Gospel of John (i. 4, 5, 9), and, in his Epistle (1 John i. 5), God is said to be "light," some, he observes, may infer that "the Father does not differ from the Son in essence." But this inference, he proceeds to say, would be wrong; for "the light, which shines in darkness, and is not comprehended by it, is not the same with that in which there is no darkness at all." The Father and the Son, he then says, are "two lights." This, surely, is not the reasoning of a Trinitarian. Once more: he expresses his disapprobation of the hypothesis that "the Spirit has no proper essence diverse from the Father and Son," and adds, "We believe that the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three essences, or three substances."

Let us next hear what he says of the inferiority of the Son. Jerome, who had access to several of his works which are now lost, or have come down to us in a corrupt and mutilated form, accuses him of saying that "the Son was not begotten, but made"; that, "compared with the Father, he is a very small light, which appears great to us on account of our feebleness." Again: Origen, he says, "takes the example of two images, a larger and smaller; of which one fills the world, and becomes in some sort invisible by its magnitude; the other falls within the limits of distinct vision. To the former he compares the Father; to the latter, the Son." He attributes, continues Jerome, "perfect goodness" only to the " Omnipotent Father," and does not allow "the Son to be good" (that is, in an absolute sense), "but only a certain breath and image of goodness."

But let us listen to Origen himself. In his commentaries on John, he pronounces "God the Logos," or Son, to be "surpassed by the God of the universe." Commenting on John i. 3, "All things were made by him," he observes, that the particle by or through (DIA), is never referred to the primary agent, but only to the secondary and subordinate; and he takes, as an example, Heb. i. 2, "By whom also he made the worlds," or ages. By this expression, he says, Paul meant to teach us that "God made the ages by the Son" as an instrument. So he adds, in the place under consideration, "If all things were made (DIA) through the Logos, they were not made (UPO) by him" (that is, as the primary cause), "but by a greater and better; and who can that be but the Father?" Again: Jesus is called the "true light"; and in "proportion as God, the Father of truth, is greater than truth, and the Father of wisdom is more noble and excellent than wisdom, — in the same proportion," says Origen, "he excels the true light." Again: the Son and Spirit, he says, "are excelled by the Father, as much or more than they excel other beings." — "He is in no respect to be compared with the Father; for he is the image of his goodness, and the effulgence, not of God, but of his glory and of his eternal light; and a ray, not of the Father, but of his power, and a pure emanation of his most powerful glory, and a spotless mirror of his energy." Again: "The Father, who sent him (Jesus), is alone good, and greater than he who was sent."

Again: Origen contends that Christ is not the object of supreme worship; and that prayer, properly such, ought never to be addressed to him, but is to be offered to the God of the universe, through his only-begotten Son, who, as our intercessor and high priest, bears our petitions to the throne of his Father and our Father, of his God and our God. On this subject he is very full and explicit. "Prayer is not to be directed," he says, "to one begotten,—not even to Christ himself; but to the God and Father of the universe alone, to whom also our Saviour prayed, and to whom he teaches us to pray. When his disciples said, 'Teach us to pray,' he taught them to pray, not to himself, but to the Father, saying, 'Our Father, who art in heaven.' For if the Son," he continues, "be different from the Father in essence, as we have proved in another place, we must either pray to the Son, and not to the Father, or to both, or to the Father alone. But no one is so absurd as to maintain that we are to pray to the Son, and not to the Father. If prayer is addressed to both, we ought to use the plural number, and say, 'Forgive, bless, preserve ye us,' or something like it; but as this is not a fit mode of address, and no example of it occurs in the Scriptures, it remains that we pray to the Father of the universe alone." He adds, "But as he, who would pray as he ought, must not pray to him who himself prays, but to Him whom Jesus our Lord taught us to invoke in prayer (namely, the Father), so no prayer is to be offered to the Father without him; which he clearly shows when he says (John xvi. 23, 24), 'Verily, verily, I say unto you, Whatsoever ye shall ask the Father in my name, he shall give it you. Hitherto ye have asked nothing in my name: ask, and ye shall receive, that your joy may be full.' For he does not say, 'Ask me,' nor 'Ask the Father,' simply; but, 'If ye shall ask the Father in my name, he shall give it you.' For, until Jesus had thus taught them, no one had asked the Father in the name of the Son; and what he said was true: 'Hitherto ye have asked nothing in my name.'" And again: "What are we to infer," asks Origen, "from the question, 'Why call ye me good? There is none good but one, — God the Father.' What but that he meant to say, 'Why pray to me? It is proper to pray to the Father alone, to whom I pray, as ye learn from the Scriptures. For ye ought not to pray to him who is constituted by the Father high priest for you, and who has received the office of advocate from the Father, but through the high priest and advocate, who can be touched with the feeling of your infirmities; having been tempted in all respects as ye are, but, by the gift of the Father, tempted without sin. Learn, therefore, how great a gift ye have received of my Father; having obtained, through generation in me the spirit of adoption, by which ye have a title to be called the sons of God and my brethren, as I said to the Father concerning you, by the mouth of David, "I will declare thy name to my brethren; in the midst of the assembly I will sing praise to thee." But it is not according to reason for a brother to be addressed in prayer by those who are glorified by the same Father. Ye we to pray to the Father alone, with and through me.'"

This we take to be sound Unitarianism. Indeed, the question of the impropriety of addressing the Son in prayer could not have been better argued by the most strenuous advocate for the divine unity at the present day.

We have thus shown, as we think, conclusively, that Origen believed God and the Son to be two essences, two substances, two beings; that he placed the Son at an immense distance from the Infinite One, and was strongly impressed with the impropriety of addressing him in prayer, strictly so called; that he viewed him, however, as standing at the head of all God's offspring, and with them, and for them, as his younger brethren, whom he had been appointed to teach and to save, offering prayer at the throne of the Eternal. Still Origen does not hesitate to apply the terms "creature" and "made" to him, and asserts that he was begotten, not from an inner necessity, but "by the will of the Father, the first-born of every creature."

To the Spirit, Origen assigned a place below the Son, by whom, according to him, it was made. To the Spirit the office of redeeming the human race properly pertained; but, it being incompetent to so great a work, the Son, who alone was adequate to accomplish it, engaged.* The Father, he says, pervades all things; the Son, only beings endowed with reason; and the Holy Spirit, only the sanctified, or saved.

We have reserved for the last place a very remarkable passage relating to the comparative rank of the Father, Son, and Spirit. It contains a plain and direct assertion, and is enough of itself to decide the question respecting Origen's opinions. He says, "Greater Is The Power Of The Father Than That Of The Son And The Holy Spirit; And Greater That Of The Son Than That Of The Holy Spirit; And Again, The Power Of The Holy Spirit Surpasses That Of Other Holy Things." Such language needs no comment.

And the Logos was a god, by John Thompson 1828


And the Logos was a god, by John Samuel Thompson [Translator of: A Monotessaron; Or The Gospel of Jesus Christ, According to the Four Evangelists, Harmonized and Chronologically Arranged in a New Translation from the Greek Text of Griesbach by the Rev. John S. Thompson 1828]

In the beginning existed the Logos, and the Logos was with God, and the Logos was a god.

1. John asserts that the Logos was with God in the beginning. In this proposition John does not affirm that the Logos was eternal, nor that he was created in the beginning; but only, that at the time this world was formed, the Logos then existed. Now if we compare the writings of Plato, Philo and the Philosophers in general, we shall find a double sense attached to the word Logos. The first merely conceptual or ideal, being nothing more than a personification of the wisdom or mind of the Deity. The second personal or substantial, being the appellative of the Son of God, when he became a real personal existence. Hence the distinction of the internal and external Logos. Whitby says: "The primitive Fathers very plainly and frequently affirm, that the Logos was strictly from all eternity, in the Father, but was produced or emitted before the creation of the world." In proof of which position he cites Justin, Athenagoras, Theophilus, Tertullian, Tatian, and Lactantius; and refers to Bull's Defence of the Nicene Creed.

Theodoret and Augustine are quoted by Corneil a Lapide, in proof that Orpheus and many of the Greek, Chaldean, and Egyptian philosophers called the supreme God, Nous or Mind, and his word, the offspring of the Mind, they denominated Logos. Let us hear Tertullian, in his Apology, addressing the heathen philosophers: "You philosophers yourselves, admit that the Logos, the word and reason, was the creator of the Universe; the Christians merely add: that the proper substance of the word and reason, is spirit; that this word must have been pronounced by God, and when pronounced, it was generated, and, consequently, it is the Son of God." "Thought, says Bossuet, which we feel produced as the offspring of our minds, as the son of our understanding, gives us some idea of the Son of God; for this reason, this Son of God, assumes the name of the Word, to intimate that he was produced in the bosom of the Father, as the inward voice arises in our souls when we contemplate truth."

John Benedict Carpsove and Professor Paulus, of Jena, have shown that besides the merely conceptual Logos, which was allowed to have always existed in the Father, Philo and many of the Jews and philosophers, attached the notion of personal subsistence to the Logos.— Dr. A. Clarke, on this passage, says: "after a serious reading of the Targums, it seems to me evident that the Chaldee term memra or word, is used personally in a multitude of places, and to attempt to give the word any other meaning in various places, would be flat opposition to every rule of construction." There is therefore one principle, in which Philosophers, Learned Jews, and the primitive Christian fathers were united: From all eternity the Logos existed, not personally, but as the reason and voice, or mind and word of God, but before the creation or commencement of time, Jehovah begot, or produced this word as a personal existence, his Son. In this latter sense, the Logos is here introduced by John, as existing with, not in God, at the beginning of time and creation; and hence John plainly teaches the personal pre-existence of Christ, as appears manifest from the whole scope of the passage, and several parts of his Gospel. The word beginning, therefore, has the same import here as in Gen.1.1.; and to interpret it to mean the beginning of the Gospel, is to divest the whole passage of force and meaning; for what propriety could there be in saying, Jesus existed when he began to preach? None! Therefore John says the Logos had life in him before he became man.

2. The Logos was a god. John does not teach that the Logos was God, in the absolute sense of the term; but in a subordinate sense. Those who contend for the supreme deity of the Logos, assert that the construction of the Greek, is such as warrants their conclusion; for say they, the word God, being the predicate of the proposition, should not have the article. Admitting this, we say, on the other hand, that had John intended to say the Logos was a god, no other form of expression could have been used, than that found in the original text: whereas had he intended to say the word is the supreme God, he could have used a different form, and have said ho theos en ho logos. Thus Origen, on this passage says: "when the word God is used to denote the self-existent being who is the author of the Universe, John places the article before it, but withholds the article when the Logos is called God." Eusebius contra Marcellum de eccles. Theol. L. 11, 17, observes that "the article is here omitted, that the Evangelist might teach a distinction between the Father and the Son; otherwise he might have said ho theos en ho logos, had he intended to call the Father and the Son the same being." See the first of these quotations in Rosenmuller, and the latter in Lampe, on this passage. Epiphanius also, cited by Pearson on the Creed, observes that if we say ho theos, God with the article, we mean the living and true God, but if we say theos, God without the article, we mean a heathen god. Hence the ablest Greek critics among the ancient fathers, who knew an hundred fold more about the construction and usage of the language than the modern critics, say John could have used the article in this phrase, had he intended to designate the Logos as the supreme God.

From what has been said it will follow, that John used the word God, when characteristic of the Logos, in a subordinate and relative sense; and this he might do, either as a Jew, following the usage of the holy Scriptures, or in imitation of the Grecian philosophers. The Hebrew Scriptures use the term God to denote beings of the Angelic order. Compare Psalm 97. 7, with Heb. 1. 6. Thus also in Psalm 86. 8, where the Hebrew says, "there is none among the gods like unto thee," the Chaldaic version says, there is none among the angels of heaven like unto thee." Jesus tells the Jews, "the law called them gods to whom the word of God came. John 10. 35. Hence we see the term god, used in the scriptures, in a subordinate sense; and we have reason to believe that it is so used in this introduction; for John could not intend to say the Logos was the same, as the God in whose presence he was.

3. All things animate or inanimate were made by the Logos. Against this proposition, two objections are made. 1. That out of about 300 instances, where the preposition dia with a genitive occurs, in the New Testament, not more than three can be found to denote the first or efficient cause: but uniformly this construction marks the instrumental cause of an action. Consequently the Father, and not the Son, is the Creator. 2. The verb egeneto never signifies to create. Now both these objections may be admitted, in their full force and extent, and yet the proposition; That all things were made by the Son, be true and perfectly maintainable. The ancient philosophers, as well as many very eminent modern writers on Cosmogony, have maintained a two-fold creation, or rather a creation and formation. A creation, strictly so named, in which the elements of things are called from nonentity into being: a formation, by which things receive their figure and adaptation for their destined use, in actual being: The first may be called a creation of essence, the second of forms of being. It is readily granted, that the scriptures uniformly describe the Father as acting through the agency of his Son: and if John contemplated the agency of the Logos in the formation of "things, his words and phrases are well adapted to express his meaning with caution and perspicuity. "What part belonged to the Son in Creation, says Rosenmuller, no mortal should dare to explain. The Ancients thus understood and believed; that the Father was the disposer of all things, but that in finishing what he had disposed, he used the agency of his Son." Lactantius de Sapien. L. 4, C. 9, says, the philosophers were not ignorant of the Logos, for even Zeno denominates the maker and disposer of the world, Logos. Philo, de Mundi Opificio, says, when the Deity decreed to form this mighty globe, he conceived the forms thereof, and afterwards constituted this intelligent world after the model he had conceived: and if it please any one to speak more openly, this archetype of the intelligible world, this idea of ideas was the Word of God." Hence the philosophers of that time and some of the Fathers, even Origen and Augustine, held the Son to be an inter-medium, if I may so say, between the Deity and the material world; as if some being more nearly connected with creation, than the eternal spirit, should be the agent in the formation of things. The Apostle Paul expressly declares all things visible and invisible were created in the Son, and by his agency, and for his use, Col. 1. 16. And again: by him God made the worlds, Heb. 1. 2. I know it is objected that the word AIWNAS of should be translated ages, but this need not be granted; for the same term is used in chap. 11. 3, of this epistle, to signify the material world: and Michaelis observes, in his notes on Pierce's Commentary, that the Jews, in their most solemn acts of devotion, address God as the Creator of the ages; doubtlessly meaning by the term ages, this system of the Universe. The Apostle Paul and the Evangelist John, therefore, clearly unite in the sentiment of the philosophers of their times, in ascribing the formation of all things to the Son of God, and hence they place him before all things, for this very reason. Surely there can be no more impossibility in Christ's agency in the forming of this world and man upon it, than in his raising the dead, calming the winds, and suspending the action of nature's laws. John tells us the world was made by the Logos. In this we believe him; but let those who say the world was not made, but only renewed or enlightened by the Logos, account for the inconceivable ignorance or wickedness of this enlightened and renewed world, in not knowing or acknowledging the Son of God!

Philo and the Logos as the Second God, by Kenneth Guthrie 1899

Philo, and the Logos as the Second God, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie 1899

1. The Prologue.—In reading the New Testament, there is one short passage, the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, which attracts attention by its peculiarity, and difference from all other books. In it we meet the Philonic conception of the Logos, applied to Jesus of Nazara. Nowhere else in the New Testament do we meet with it. The word "Logos" occurs in the Synoptics, but only in the sense of human reason or discourse. We meet the term suddenly without any explaination of it, as if it must be familiar to everybody.

How shall we account for this fact?

That it is a Philonic term, no one can doubt. The only question can be, was it taken from Philo's writings at first hand, or only indirectly? Meyer, Lucke, Reuss, Beyschlag, Weizsacker, Harnack, plead for the first alternative; Luthardt, Weiss, Liddon, Godet and Plummer plead for the second.

The earliest date for the Fourth Gospel is usually accepted to be 70-100 A. D.; many religious authorities accepting 99 A. D. Philo flourished 40-50 A. D.; so that there would have been plenty of time for popular acquaintance with his doctrine. To this must be added the fact that the Targums had circulated among the Palestinian Jews and the Apocryphal literature among the Greek-speaking Jews for several centuries, so that in any case Philo's use of the term Logos cannot have been strange or unfamiliar in the conception it represented. Such conditions would greatly favour rapid spread of his doctrine, especially if we remember that we must consider Philo as summing up the partial labours of many Jews before him, and not as a philosopher who had introduced in the world of thought a new idea or occupied a new mental stand-point.

Yet these explainations do not give us a satisfactory answer to the question, how shall we account for the appearance of the Logos in this Prologue?

Many commentators have held that in this Prologue the author of the Fourth Gospel purposely gives us a definite, distinct outline of the philosophy of Christianity, or a divinely revealed account of cosmology as the knowledge of it is in God, and as it is revealed by the Spirit.

Such a claim is however seen to be doubtful when we can trace every element of this divine revelation in the works of pagans or Jews, whom nobody has ever held to be divinely inspired, and none of whom claimed it themselves. Such a claim must then be considered unfounded or at least unproven. How then shall we account for it?

2. Only Mention of the Logos.—We may point out again, in the first place, how familiar the conception of the Logos seems to be to the writer, and how familiar he assumes it to be to those to whom or for whom he is writing. Some commentators have then supposed that the writer used these familiar terms to explain what he meant, just as Paul, in his Epistles of the imprisonment used the Gnostic term "fulness" and modern theologians use the concept of evolution in their sermons. Stevens says: "It is as if John had said to his readers: 'You are familiar with the speculations which have been long rife respecting tha means whereby God reveals himself,—the doctrine of an intermediate agent through whom he communicates his life and light to men. The true answer to the question regarding this mediator is, that it is our Lord Jesus Christ. He is God's agent in revelation; he is the bond which unites heaven and earth."'

We have seen that except in this Prologue, the Logos not mentioned anywhere in the New Testament. Harnack sees in th1s fact the following significance:

"The Prologue of the Gospel is not the key to the understanding of the Gospel, but it prepares the Hellenistic readers therefor. The writer seizes upon a known quantity, the Logos, works it over and transforms it—implicitly combating false christologies —in order to substitute for it Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son, that is, in order to disclose it as being this same Jesus Christ. From the moment when this is done, the Logos-idea is allowed to fall away. The author continues his narrative now fully concernng Jesus, in order to establish the Faith that he is the Messiah the Son of God. This belief has for its principal element the recognition that Jesus originates from God and from heaven; but the author is far removed from the purpose of securing this recognition from cosmological and philosophical considerations. Upon the basis of his testimony, and because he has taught the full knowledge of God and life—absolutely heavenly and divine benefits—-he leaves Jesus prove himself, according to the Evangelist, to be the Messiah, the Son of God."

3. Was the Conception of the Logos the Traditional One?—It may be asked, if the writer of the Fourth Gospel took the conception of Logos to illustrate what he believed of the person of Jesus of Nazara, did he do so unreservedly, or did he alter the conception of the Logos?

To answer this question it will be necessary to turn to the Prologue itself. A literal translation of the first few verses is as follows:

"In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with 'The God,' and the Logos was 'God.'"

"He (the Logos) was in the beginning with 'The God,' etc."

Now, a glance at the doctrine of Philo will show us that the writer of the Prologue has reproduced the very technical terms of Philo, distinguishing between "The God," and "God."

If the writer had intended to depart consciously from Philo's doctrine, he would have written: "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with "The God," and the Logos was "The God." He was in the beginning with "The God," etc.

Besides, knowing that Philo's doctrine, distinguishing between "The God," and "God," was widely known, if he intended to depart from it, he would not only have made that alteration suggested, but would have distinctly said: "This doctrine of the Logos with which you are acquainted represents our conception of the person of Jesus of Nazara admirably, with this exception: that while with Philo the Logos is only "God," and not "The God," our conception of Jesus distinctly requires that he should be called "The God," as well as the Father who is "The God."

This would be especially the case, since this would be the very crucial point of dispute.

If, however, we suppose that the writer of the Fourth Gospel believed the Logos to be fully as divine as the Father, and wrote as he did we must assume the following facts:

I. While knowing that the Philonic conception assigned a dependent and inferior rank to the Logos, and that this very terminology indicated that fact, he used it, without the slightest alteration.

II. He made the distinction indicated ("God" without the article) between two occurrences of the words "The God" consciously knowing that this was a very conspicuous place, and by making it here he would acknowledge he was cognisant of the Philonic distinction.

III. Although his conception of the Logos had changed, yet he used the old terminology unchanged, in the very crucial point, and in a place where it would have been singularly easy to change it, and to make the change very prominent.

Such assumptions are, however, absurd on their face, and can only be held if we have a case to make out.

Perhaps the best way in which we will be able to reach some knowledge of what he meant exactly will be to inquire how thsecondemporary and later writers interpreted this his statement, or conception of the cosmical Logos. To the answer of this question we will devote the Second Book of this Essay.

4. Pearson's Explanation.—In a future Chapter we shall see that Paul makes the same distinction between "God" and "The God" which we find in the prologue of the Fourth Gospel. It cannot be chance, or individual characteristics which dictated such a distinction ; there must have been a settled purpose.

Pearson, being ignorant of the Philonic origin of the distinction, considers it a mere captious objection, founded on a passage of Epiphanius, where "God" is the god or gods of the Gentiles, but "The God" the divinity of Jews and Hebrews.

Such ignorance would be its own refutation in the eyes of all fair-minded persons, if observed in any author other than Pearson. He endeavours to break down the distinction by noting that in many places in which God the Father is referred to (in his own opinion) the word "God" is used; as in: "There was a man sent from God whose name was John" and "no man hath ever seen God at any time."

Yet Pearson does not endeavour to show any passage in which Christ is spoken of as "The God." If he had, the distinction would break down. But he cannot, for there is no such passage in the New Testament.

We may easily explain the fact that in very many places God the Father is referred to as simply "God." Before the Philonic conception was made, God was always referred to as "God," as for instance by Plato. Long habit then had made it usual to refer the highest divinity the name "God," and so except where the metaphysical distinction was consciously made, it was usual to use the traditional name. Satisfactory as this explanation is, and impossible as it is to quote an instance in which "the God" is referred to Christ (which should be possible if, as Pearson claims, the terms are synonymous as to meaning, without any particular distinction), it is capable of proof that wherever the Father and Christ are mentioned together, and the Father is called " God," there Christ has no divinity at all ascribed to him, the natural inference being to the contrary. "But to us there is but one 'God,' the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him." Here it is asserted that there is but one God, and that this one only God is the Father. Next is mentioned "our Lord Jesus Christ." He cannot then be God, inasmuch as there is but one God, and that one God is the Father.

Besides this explanation, we have still one more to offer; it would be possible to call the Father God as well as "The God," because "God" is in "The God." But "The God" is not in "God." All roses are flowers; but not all flowers roses. Thus, all "God" is "The God," but not all "The God" is "God." Thus we might with perfect propriety speak of the Father as "God," even while recognizing Philo's metaphysical distinction.

5. The Meaning of the Doctrine.—Merely to prove that the Logos-idea of the Fourth Gospel is Philonic is not sufficient; we must show what the Philonic conception of the Logos is.

The Logos is the highest manifestation of the power of God; "all things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that was made." He mediates between "The God" and man. so that he represents "The God" to man. "The God" himself is far above all description or comprehension; so that we only know him through the Logos. Consequently, "The God" is God, wisdom, knowledge, power and love in a superlative sense; whereas the Logos is God, wisdom, knowledge, power and love in a proper and actual sense.

It is this fact which is lost sight of by many theologians. They forget that if we follow Philo, we may call the Logos very God, and Divine Knowledge Will and Power, without in the least impugning his subordination to "The first God." Philo considers the Logos only a "God" in a secondary sense, in a secondary degree of existence, depending for its cause and ground absolutely on the first. Whereas "The first God" is above all definition, the "second God" may be both defined, and his qualities may be spoken of. It is evident that the comprehensible is less than the incomprehensible, the undefinable more than the definable and describable. And whereas the "second God" absolutely depends on "The God," "The God" does not depend on the "second God."

We repeat that this fact is usually lost sight of by theologians. They think as Bishop Bull, in his Defense of the Nicene Creed, does, that if they can prove that a Church Father called the Logos God, then they have disproved that he is a subordinationist, even if he speaks of a "second God." Then they consider him orthodox in the Athanasian sense, which involves the additional difficulty  that the Son is both begotten of the Father and equal to him. On the contrary, the Church Father in question affirms that the Logos is God, but holds his absolute subordination to "The God" in a deeper sense, so that the Son's Divinity is based on his dependence on the Father; not that the Son is equal to the Father by virtue of his Divinity.

Wherever then, in later history, we hear of a "second God" or of a secondary grade of Being, we must recognize Philo's strictly subordinational view, even if the Logos is called very God; the inconsistence thus being only apparent, which would be an actual contradiction in terms with the Athanasian conception.


[Also from this author: The externalized Logos is not only a divine power, but is also a personal being which stands mid-way between God and the world. He is the Mediator between them, teaching man the laws and commandments of God, and presenting to God a plea for man. He is the high-priest. Thus the Logos is different from both, being neither unbegotten, nor brought forth like other creatures, in degree. He is the older, first-born Son; all else is the younger son of God. Of this offspring God is the Father, and Wisdom the Mother. Referring to Gen.xxxi: 12,13, LXX, Philo says: "Let us examine carefully as to whether there are really two Gods, for it is said 'I am the God who appeared to thee' not in my place, but 'in the place of God' (Bethel), as if another deity were referred to. How are we to treat this statement? The explanation is that the true God is one, but those improperly so called are many. The Sacred Scripture, therefore, denotes the true God by the article,saying, 'I am The God' (Ho Theos),and in the other case omits it: 'Who appeared to thee in the place,' not of 'The God,' but merely 'of God.' Here he calls his eldest Logos God, having no superstitious feeling about the application of names."

Inasmuch as the Logos appears as the representant of God, he may also be called God; but with this distinction: The unbegotten God is called "The God," the Logos is called "God," without the article. The Logos is the "second God," and "the highest angel;" as the Platonic archetypal idea of man, he may be called the divine man.

The Logos is not the only divine power, there are other Logi who are distinct from him, and subordinated to him. They are not distinctly conceived by Philo, who at one time looks upon them as mere ideal revelations of God's power, and at another, as personal beings, who are the servants of God in the creation and guidance of the world. Their number is also indefinite: at one time they are only two, the creative and ruling powers; at another fiv : the creative, ruling, commanding, forbidding and forgiving powers. Here we have a clear representation of the Persian angelology.]