Philo, and the Logos as the Second God, by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie 1899
1. The Prologue.—In reading the New Testament, there is one short passage, the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, which attracts attention by its peculiarity, and difference from all other books. In it we meet the Philonic conception of the Logos, applied to Jesus of Nazara. Nowhere else in the New Testament do we meet with it. The word "Logos" occurs in the Synoptics, but only in the sense of human reason or discourse. We meet the term suddenly without any explaination of it, as if it must be familiar to everybody.
How shall we account for this fact?
That it is a Philonic term, no one can doubt. The only question can be, was it taken from Philo's writings at first hand, or only indirectly? Meyer, Lucke, Reuss, Beyschlag, Weizsacker, Harnack, plead for the first alternative; Luthardt, Weiss, Liddon, Godet and Plummer plead for the second.
The earliest date for the Fourth Gospel is usually accepted to be 70-100 A. D.; many religious authorities accepting 99 A. D. Philo flourished 40-50 A. D.; so that there would have been plenty of time for popular acquaintance with his doctrine. To this must be added the fact that the Targums had circulated among the Palestinian Jews and the Apocryphal literature among the Greek-speaking Jews for several centuries, so that in any case Philo's use of the term Logos cannot have been strange or unfamiliar in the conception it represented. Such conditions would greatly favour rapid spread of his doctrine, especially if we remember that we must consider Philo as summing up the partial labours of many Jews before him, and not as a philosopher who had introduced in the world of thought a new idea or occupied a new mental stand-point.
Yet these explainations do not give us a satisfactory answer to the question, how shall we account for the appearance of the Logos in this Prologue?
Many commentators have held that in this Prologue the author of the Fourth Gospel purposely gives us a definite, distinct outline of the philosophy of Christianity, or a divinely revealed account of cosmology as the knowledge of it is in God, and as it is revealed by the Spirit.
Such a claim is however seen to be doubtful when we can trace every element of this divine revelation in the works of pagans or Jews, whom nobody has ever held to be divinely inspired, and none of whom claimed it themselves. Such a claim must then be considered unfounded or at least unproven. How then shall we account for it?
2. Only Mention of the Logos.—We may point out again, in the first place, how familiar the conception of the Logos seems to be to the writer, and how familiar he assumes it to be to those to whom or for whom he is writing. Some commentators have then supposed that the writer used these familiar terms to explain what he meant, just as Paul, in his Epistles of the imprisonment used the Gnostic term "fulness" and modern theologians use the concept of evolution in their sermons. Stevens says: "It is as if John had said to his readers: 'You are familiar with the speculations which have been long rife respecting tha means whereby God reveals himself,—the doctrine of an intermediate agent through whom he communicates his life and light to men. The true answer to the question regarding this mediator is, that it is our Lord Jesus Christ. He is God's agent in revelation; he is the bond which unites heaven and earth."'
We have seen that except in this Prologue, the Logos not mentioned anywhere in the New Testament. Harnack sees in th1s fact the following significance:
"The Prologue of the Gospel is not the key to the understanding of the Gospel, but it prepares the Hellenistic readers therefor. The writer seizes upon a known quantity, the Logos, works it over and transforms it—implicitly combating false christologies —in order to substitute for it Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son, that is, in order to disclose it as being this same Jesus Christ. From the moment when this is done, the Logos-idea is allowed to fall away. The author continues his narrative now fully concernng Jesus, in order to establish the Faith that he is the Messiah the Son of God. This belief has for its principal element the recognition that Jesus originates from God and from heaven; but the author is far removed from the purpose of securing this recognition from cosmological and philosophical considerations. Upon the basis of his testimony, and because he has taught the full knowledge of God and life—absolutely heavenly and divine benefits—-he leaves Jesus prove himself, according to the Evangelist, to be the Messiah, the Son of God."
3. Was the Conception of the Logos the Traditional One?—It may be asked, if the writer of the Fourth Gospel took the conception of Logos to illustrate what he believed of the person of Jesus of Nazara, did he do so unreservedly, or did he alter the conception of the Logos?
To answer this question it will be necessary to turn to the Prologue itself. A literal translation of the first few verses is as follows:
"In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with 'The God,' and the Logos was 'God.'"
"He (the Logos) was in the beginning with 'The God,' etc."
Now, a glance at the doctrine of Philo will show us that the writer of the Prologue has reproduced the very technical terms of Philo, distinguishing between "The God," and "God."
If the writer had intended to depart consciously from Philo's doctrine, he would have written: "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with "The God," and the Logos was "The God." He was in the beginning with "The God," etc.
Besides, knowing that Philo's doctrine, distinguishing between "The God," and "God," was widely known, if he intended to depart from it, he would not only have made that alteration suggested, but would have distinctly said: "This doctrine of the Logos with which you are acquainted represents our conception of the person of Jesus of Nazara admirably, with this exception: that while with Philo the Logos is only "God," and not "The God," our conception of Jesus distinctly requires that he should be called "The God," as well as the Father who is "The God."
This would be especially the case, since this would be the very crucial point of dispute.
If, however, we suppose that the writer of the Fourth Gospel believed the Logos to be fully as divine as the Father, and wrote as he did we must assume the following facts:
I. While knowing that the Philonic conception assigned a dependent and inferior rank to the Logos, and that this very terminology indicated that fact, he used it, without the slightest alteration.
II. He made the distinction indicated ("God" without the article) between two occurrences of the words "The God" consciously knowing that this was a very conspicuous place, and by making it here he would acknowledge he was cognisant of the Philonic distinction.
III. Although his conception of the Logos had changed, yet he used the old terminology unchanged, in the very crucial point, and in a place where it would have been singularly easy to change it, and to make the change very prominent.
Such assumptions are, however, absurd on their face, and can only be held if we have a case to make out.
Perhaps the best way in which we will be able to reach some knowledge of what he meant exactly will be to inquire how thsecondemporary and later writers interpreted this his statement, or conception of the cosmical Logos. To the answer of this question we will devote the Second Book of this Essay.
4. Pearson's Explanation.—In a future Chapter we shall see that Paul makes the same distinction between "God" and "The God" which we find in the prologue of the Fourth Gospel. It cannot be chance, or individual characteristics which dictated such a distinction ; there must have been a settled purpose.
Pearson, being ignorant of the Philonic origin of the distinction, considers it a mere captious objection, founded on a passage of Epiphanius, where "God" is the god or gods of the Gentiles, but "The God" the divinity of Jews and Hebrews.
Such ignorance would be its own refutation in the eyes of all fair-minded persons, if observed in any author other than Pearson. He endeavours to break down the distinction by noting that in many places in which God the Father is referred to (in his own opinion) the word "God" is used; as in: "There was a man sent from God whose name was John" and "no man hath ever seen God at any time."
Yet Pearson does not endeavour to show any passage in which Christ is spoken of as "The God." If he had, the distinction would break down. But he cannot, for there is no such passage in the New Testament.
We may easily explain the fact that in very many places God the Father is referred to as simply "God." Before the Philonic conception was made, God was always referred to as "God," as for instance by Plato. Long habit then had made it usual to refer the highest divinity the name "God," and so except where the metaphysical distinction was consciously made, it was usual to use the traditional name. Satisfactory as this explanation is, and impossible as it is to quote an instance in which "the God" is referred to Christ (which should be possible if, as Pearson claims, the terms are synonymous as to meaning, without any particular distinction), it is capable of proof that wherever the Father and Christ are mentioned together, and the Father is called " God," there Christ has no divinity at all ascribed to him, the natural inference being to the contrary. "But to us there is but one 'God,' the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him." Here it is asserted that there is but one God, and that this one only God is the Father. Next is mentioned "our Lord Jesus Christ." He cannot then be God, inasmuch as there is but one God, and that one God is the Father.
Besides this explanation, we have still one more to offer; it would be possible to call the Father God as well as "The God," because "God" is in "The God." But "The God" is not in "God." All roses are flowers; but not all flowers roses. Thus, all "God" is "The God," but not all "The God" is "God." Thus we might with perfect propriety speak of the Father as "God," even while recognizing Philo's metaphysical distinction.
5. The Meaning of the Doctrine.—Merely to prove that the Logos-idea of the Fourth Gospel is Philonic is not sufficient; we must show what the Philonic conception of the Logos is.
The Logos is the highest manifestation of the power of God; "all things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that was made." He mediates between "The God" and man. so that he represents "The God" to man. "The God" himself is far above all description or comprehension; so that we only know him through the Logos. Consequently, "The God" is God, wisdom, knowledge, power and love in a superlative sense; whereas the Logos is God, wisdom, knowledge, power and love in a proper and actual sense.
It is this fact which is lost sight of by many theologians. They forget that if we follow Philo, we may call the Logos very God, and Divine Knowledge Will and Power, without in the least impugning his subordination to "The first God." Philo considers the Logos only a "God" in a secondary sense, in a secondary degree of existence, depending for its cause and ground absolutely on the first. Whereas "The first God" is above all definition, the "second God" may be both defined, and his qualities may be spoken of. It is evident that the comprehensible is less than the incomprehensible, the undefinable more than the definable and describable. And whereas the "second God" absolutely depends on "The God," "The God" does not depend on the "second God."
We repeat that this fact is usually lost sight of by theologians. They think as Bishop Bull, in his Defense of the Nicene Creed, does, that if they can prove that a Church Father called the Logos God, then they have disproved that he is a subordinationist, even if he speaks of a "second God." Then they consider him orthodox in the Athanasian sense, which involves the additional difficulty that the Son is both begotten of the Father and equal to him. On the contrary, the Church Father in question affirms that the Logos is God, but holds his absolute subordination to "The God" in a deeper sense, so that the Son's Divinity is based on his dependence on the Father; not that the Son is equal to the Father by virtue of his Divinity.
Wherever then, in later history, we hear of a "second God" or of a secondary grade of Being, we must recognize Philo's strictly subordinational view, even if the Logos is called very God; the inconsistence thus being only apparent, which would be an actual contradiction in terms with the Athanasian conception.
[Also from this author: The externalized Logos is not only a divine power, but is also a personal being which stands mid-way between God and the world. He is the Mediator between them, teaching man the laws and commandments of God, and presenting to God a plea for man. He is the high-priest. Thus the Logos is different from both, being neither unbegotten, nor brought forth like other creatures, in degree. He is the older, first-born Son; all else is the younger son of God. Of this offspring God is the Father, and Wisdom the Mother. Referring to Gen.xxxi: 12,13, LXX, Philo says: "Let us examine carefully as to whether there are really two Gods, for it is said 'I am the God who appeared to thee' not in my place, but 'in the place of God' (Bethel), as if another deity were referred to. How are we to treat this statement? The explanation is that the true God is one, but those improperly so called are many. The Sacred Scripture, therefore, denotes the true God by the article,saying, 'I am The God' (Ho Theos),and in the other case omits it: 'Who appeared to thee in the place,' not of 'The God,' but merely 'of God.' Here he calls his eldest Logos God, having no superstitious feeling about the application of names."
Inasmuch as the Logos appears as the representant of God, he may also be called God; but with this distinction: The unbegotten God is called "The God," the Logos is called "God," without the article. The Logos is the "second God," and "the highest angel;" as the Platonic archetypal idea of man, he may be called the divine man.
The Logos is not the only divine power, there are other Logi who are distinct from him, and subordinated to him. They are not distinctly conceived by Philo, who at one time looks upon them as mere ideal revelations of God's power, and at another, as personal beings, who are the servants of God in the creation and guidance of the world. Their number is also indefinite: at one time they are only two, the creative and ruling powers; at another fiv : the creative, ruling, commanding, forbidding and forgiving powers. Here we have a clear representation of the Persian angelology.]
1. The Prologue.—In reading the New Testament, there is one short passage, the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, which attracts attention by its peculiarity, and difference from all other books. In it we meet the Philonic conception of the Logos, applied to Jesus of Nazara. Nowhere else in the New Testament do we meet with it. The word "Logos" occurs in the Synoptics, but only in the sense of human reason or discourse. We meet the term suddenly without any explaination of it, as if it must be familiar to everybody.
How shall we account for this fact?
That it is a Philonic term, no one can doubt. The only question can be, was it taken from Philo's writings at first hand, or only indirectly? Meyer, Lucke, Reuss, Beyschlag, Weizsacker, Harnack, plead for the first alternative; Luthardt, Weiss, Liddon, Godet and Plummer plead for the second.
The earliest date for the Fourth Gospel is usually accepted to be 70-100 A. D.; many religious authorities accepting 99 A. D. Philo flourished 40-50 A. D.; so that there would have been plenty of time for popular acquaintance with his doctrine. To this must be added the fact that the Targums had circulated among the Palestinian Jews and the Apocryphal literature among the Greek-speaking Jews for several centuries, so that in any case Philo's use of the term Logos cannot have been strange or unfamiliar in the conception it represented. Such conditions would greatly favour rapid spread of his doctrine, especially if we remember that we must consider Philo as summing up the partial labours of many Jews before him, and not as a philosopher who had introduced in the world of thought a new idea or occupied a new mental stand-point.
Yet these explainations do not give us a satisfactory answer to the question, how shall we account for the appearance of the Logos in this Prologue?
Many commentators have held that in this Prologue the author of the Fourth Gospel purposely gives us a definite, distinct outline of the philosophy of Christianity, or a divinely revealed account of cosmology as the knowledge of it is in God, and as it is revealed by the Spirit.
Such a claim is however seen to be doubtful when we can trace every element of this divine revelation in the works of pagans or Jews, whom nobody has ever held to be divinely inspired, and none of whom claimed it themselves. Such a claim must then be considered unfounded or at least unproven. How then shall we account for it?
2. Only Mention of the Logos.—We may point out again, in the first place, how familiar the conception of the Logos seems to be to the writer, and how familiar he assumes it to be to those to whom or for whom he is writing. Some commentators have then supposed that the writer used these familiar terms to explain what he meant, just as Paul, in his Epistles of the imprisonment used the Gnostic term "fulness" and modern theologians use the concept of evolution in their sermons. Stevens says: "It is as if John had said to his readers: 'You are familiar with the speculations which have been long rife respecting tha means whereby God reveals himself,—the doctrine of an intermediate agent through whom he communicates his life and light to men. The true answer to the question regarding this mediator is, that it is our Lord Jesus Christ. He is God's agent in revelation; he is the bond which unites heaven and earth."'
We have seen that except in this Prologue, the Logos not mentioned anywhere in the New Testament. Harnack sees in th1s fact the following significance:
"The Prologue of the Gospel is not the key to the understanding of the Gospel, but it prepares the Hellenistic readers therefor. The writer seizes upon a known quantity, the Logos, works it over and transforms it—implicitly combating false christologies —in order to substitute for it Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son, that is, in order to disclose it as being this same Jesus Christ. From the moment when this is done, the Logos-idea is allowed to fall away. The author continues his narrative now fully concernng Jesus, in order to establish the Faith that he is the Messiah the Son of God. This belief has for its principal element the recognition that Jesus originates from God and from heaven; but the author is far removed from the purpose of securing this recognition from cosmological and philosophical considerations. Upon the basis of his testimony, and because he has taught the full knowledge of God and life—absolutely heavenly and divine benefits—-he leaves Jesus prove himself, according to the Evangelist, to be the Messiah, the Son of God."
3. Was the Conception of the Logos the Traditional One?—It may be asked, if the writer of the Fourth Gospel took the conception of Logos to illustrate what he believed of the person of Jesus of Nazara, did he do so unreservedly, or did he alter the conception of the Logos?
To answer this question it will be necessary to turn to the Prologue itself. A literal translation of the first few verses is as follows:
"In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with 'The God,' and the Logos was 'God.'"
"He (the Logos) was in the beginning with 'The God,' etc."
Now, a glance at the doctrine of Philo will show us that the writer of the Prologue has reproduced the very technical terms of Philo, distinguishing between "The God," and "God."
If the writer had intended to depart consciously from Philo's doctrine, he would have written: "In the beginning was the Logos, and the Logos was with "The God," and the Logos was "The God." He was in the beginning with "The God," etc.
Besides, knowing that Philo's doctrine, distinguishing between "The God," and "God," was widely known, if he intended to depart from it, he would not only have made that alteration suggested, but would have distinctly said: "This doctrine of the Logos with which you are acquainted represents our conception of the person of Jesus of Nazara admirably, with this exception: that while with Philo the Logos is only "God," and not "The God," our conception of Jesus distinctly requires that he should be called "The God," as well as the Father who is "The God."
This would be especially the case, since this would be the very crucial point of dispute.
If, however, we suppose that the writer of the Fourth Gospel believed the Logos to be fully as divine as the Father, and wrote as he did we must assume the following facts:
I. While knowing that the Philonic conception assigned a dependent and inferior rank to the Logos, and that this very terminology indicated that fact, he used it, without the slightest alteration.
II. He made the distinction indicated ("God" without the article) between two occurrences of the words "The God" consciously knowing that this was a very conspicuous place, and by making it here he would acknowledge he was cognisant of the Philonic distinction.
III. Although his conception of the Logos had changed, yet he used the old terminology unchanged, in the very crucial point, and in a place where it would have been singularly easy to change it, and to make the change very prominent.
Such assumptions are, however, absurd on their face, and can only be held if we have a case to make out.
Perhaps the best way in which we will be able to reach some knowledge of what he meant exactly will be to inquire how thsecondemporary and later writers interpreted this his statement, or conception of the cosmical Logos. To the answer of this question we will devote the Second Book of this Essay.
4. Pearson's Explanation.—In a future Chapter we shall see that Paul makes the same distinction between "God" and "The God" which we find in the prologue of the Fourth Gospel. It cannot be chance, or individual characteristics which dictated such a distinction ; there must have been a settled purpose.
Pearson, being ignorant of the Philonic origin of the distinction, considers it a mere captious objection, founded on a passage of Epiphanius, where "God" is the god or gods of the Gentiles, but "The God" the divinity of Jews and Hebrews.
Such ignorance would be its own refutation in the eyes of all fair-minded persons, if observed in any author other than Pearson. He endeavours to break down the distinction by noting that in many places in which God the Father is referred to (in his own opinion) the word "God" is used; as in: "There was a man sent from God whose name was John" and "no man hath ever seen God at any time."
Yet Pearson does not endeavour to show any passage in which Christ is spoken of as "The God." If he had, the distinction would break down. But he cannot, for there is no such passage in the New Testament.
We may easily explain the fact that in very many places God the Father is referred to as simply "God." Before the Philonic conception was made, God was always referred to as "God," as for instance by Plato. Long habit then had made it usual to refer the highest divinity the name "God," and so except where the metaphysical distinction was consciously made, it was usual to use the traditional name. Satisfactory as this explanation is, and impossible as it is to quote an instance in which "the God" is referred to Christ (which should be possible if, as Pearson claims, the terms are synonymous as to meaning, without any particular distinction), it is capable of proof that wherever the Father and Christ are mentioned together, and the Father is called " God," there Christ has no divinity at all ascribed to him, the natural inference being to the contrary. "But to us there is but one 'God,' the Father, of whom are all things, and we in him; and one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, and we by him." Here it is asserted that there is but one God, and that this one only God is the Father. Next is mentioned "our Lord Jesus Christ." He cannot then be God, inasmuch as there is but one God, and that one God is the Father.
Besides this explanation, we have still one more to offer; it would be possible to call the Father God as well as "The God," because "God" is in "The God." But "The God" is not in "God." All roses are flowers; but not all flowers roses. Thus, all "God" is "The God," but not all "The God" is "God." Thus we might with perfect propriety speak of the Father as "God," even while recognizing Philo's metaphysical distinction.
5. The Meaning of the Doctrine.—Merely to prove that the Logos-idea of the Fourth Gospel is Philonic is not sufficient; we must show what the Philonic conception of the Logos is.
The Logos is the highest manifestation of the power of God; "all things were made by him; and without him was not anything made that was made." He mediates between "The God" and man. so that he represents "The God" to man. "The God" himself is far above all description or comprehension; so that we only know him through the Logos. Consequently, "The God" is God, wisdom, knowledge, power and love in a superlative sense; whereas the Logos is God, wisdom, knowledge, power and love in a proper and actual sense.
It is this fact which is lost sight of by many theologians. They forget that if we follow Philo, we may call the Logos very God, and Divine Knowledge Will and Power, without in the least impugning his subordination to "The first God." Philo considers the Logos only a "God" in a secondary sense, in a secondary degree of existence, depending for its cause and ground absolutely on the first. Whereas "The first God" is above all definition, the "second God" may be both defined, and his qualities may be spoken of. It is evident that the comprehensible is less than the incomprehensible, the undefinable more than the definable and describable. And whereas the "second God" absolutely depends on "The God," "The God" does not depend on the "second God."
We repeat that this fact is usually lost sight of by theologians. They think as Bishop Bull, in his Defense of the Nicene Creed, does, that if they can prove that a Church Father called the Logos God, then they have disproved that he is a subordinationist, even if he speaks of a "second God." Then they consider him orthodox in the Athanasian sense, which involves the additional difficulty that the Son is both begotten of the Father and equal to him. On the contrary, the Church Father in question affirms that the Logos is God, but holds his absolute subordination to "The God" in a deeper sense, so that the Son's Divinity is based on his dependence on the Father; not that the Son is equal to the Father by virtue of his Divinity.
Wherever then, in later history, we hear of a "second God" or of a secondary grade of Being, we must recognize Philo's strictly subordinational view, even if the Logos is called very God; the inconsistence thus being only apparent, which would be an actual contradiction in terms with the Athanasian conception.
[Also from this author: The externalized Logos is not only a divine power, but is also a personal being which stands mid-way between God and the world. He is the Mediator between them, teaching man the laws and commandments of God, and presenting to God a plea for man. He is the high-priest. Thus the Logos is different from both, being neither unbegotten, nor brought forth like other creatures, in degree. He is the older, first-born Son; all else is the younger son of God. Of this offspring God is the Father, and Wisdom the Mother. Referring to Gen.xxxi: 12,13, LXX, Philo says: "Let us examine carefully as to whether there are really two Gods, for it is said 'I am the God who appeared to thee' not in my place, but 'in the place of God' (Bethel), as if another deity were referred to. How are we to treat this statement? The explanation is that the true God is one, but those improperly so called are many. The Sacred Scripture, therefore, denotes the true God by the article,saying, 'I am The God' (Ho Theos),and in the other case omits it: 'Who appeared to thee in the place,' not of 'The God,' but merely 'of God.' Here he calls his eldest Logos God, having no superstitious feeling about the application of names."
Inasmuch as the Logos appears as the representant of God, he may also be called God; but with this distinction: The unbegotten God is called "The God," the Logos is called "God," without the article. The Logos is the "second God," and "the highest angel;" as the Platonic archetypal idea of man, he may be called the divine man.
The Logos is not the only divine power, there are other Logi who are distinct from him, and subordinated to him. They are not distinctly conceived by Philo, who at one time looks upon them as mere ideal revelations of God's power, and at another, as personal beings, who are the servants of God in the creation and guidance of the world. Their number is also indefinite: at one time they are only two, the creative and ruling powers; at another fiv : the creative, ruling, commanding, forbidding and forgiving powers. Here we have a clear representation of the Persian angelology.]
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